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"Clarity of language is essential to clarity of thought."'
In the last quarter century since the first in vitro baby made her debut,
2
society has witnessed a revolution in its understanding of reproduction and
in its utilization of reproductive technologies. While not everyone agrees
that its use is beneficial to society,3 labeling has played a major role in
shaping society's views about reproduction and reproductive technology.
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1. The Ramsey Colloquium, Experimenting on Embryos is Unethical, in REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 125, 127 (Carol Wekesser et al. eds., 1996).
2. Louise Brown, the first IVF-conceived baby brought to term, was born in England in 1978.
Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
101, 106 (2003).
3. See, e.g., MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN
An early (and continuing) example of how language has promoted a
particular mind-set can be seen in the setting of abortion politics. Following
Roe v. Wade,4 the term "pro-abortion" was perhaps meant to capture one's
willingness to accept abortion as an acceptable alternative available to
pregnant women. Those who did not believe that pregnant women had the
right to terminate the biological life within were branded as "anti-abortion."
The negative terminology was soon reversed to a positive image - "pro-life"
- thereby inferring that everyone else was "anti-life." Not to be so depicted,
those supporting Roe redesigned their position as "pro-choice."5  The
classification enabled the separation of the theoretical (choice) from the
actual (abortion). It also permitted a reconciliation between two seemingly
inconsistent positions: respecting life while sanctioning its termination.
The above illustrates what has been identified as the central issue
concerning the utilization of reproductive technologies: the interface of law
with morality.6 In consideration is the extent to which the law should
intervene to prevent "immoral" conduct. Lord Devlin, referenced by the
British, espoused the position that "if law did not enforce what society held
to be morally right and wrong, then society itself would disintegrate., 7 A
prominent group in the United States, the American Fertility Society (now
the ASRM), 8 rejects the concept of governmental interference with private
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY Xi (1985) (finding no consensus at the time); John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 442-50 (2003). Robertson has
devised a classification scheme in which he places those who do not approve of the new
reproductive technologies as "strict traditionalists." Id. at 442-44. At the opposite end of the
spectrum are those adhering to a view he labels as "radical liberty." Id. at 444-46. They would
place no limits on the use of reproductive technologies, premised on a concurrent belief in extreme
individualism. Id. The third group, in which he places himself, is labeled "modem traditionalist."
Id. at 446, 450. Viewholders in the latter group would accept use of reproductive technologies with
few limitations, Id., in order to promote adult individualistic choice. Id. at 467 (noting that the key
to its use would be its importance to the decision-maker).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See S. I. HAYAKAWA & ALAN R. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 110
(Harvest 5th ed. 1990) (discussing abortion semantics in terms of "baby," "murder," "pro-life," and
"fetus").
6. WARNOCK, supra note 3, at x.
7. Id. at xi. See also Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in
Health Care, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 245, 248 (2000). Prof. Scott asserts that
moral views are often enacted in law. See id. This is particularly important with respect to conduct
that is considered unacceptable. While the law generally provides no reward for good behavior, it
deals a "punch" to behavior that falls below the legal norm, as illegal conduct is subject to
punishment. Declaring a particular behavior as illegal is a societal expression of consensus about the
ethical wrongness of the conduct. Id. at 259-60. Social consensus and law are thus joined, thereby
ending the public debate over the morality of the conduct because the crystallization in law had
defined the boundaries. Id. at 260-62. Understanding this phenomenon helps explain why there
would be an effort to orient the public to reach a consensus that sacrificial manipulations of the
implanted embryo would be legally unacceptable. The implication is that other manipulations, prior
to implantation, have not crossed the boundary and would thereby be permissible under the law.
8. Nanette R. Elster, HIV and ART: Reproductive Choices and Challenges, 19 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 415, 416 (2003) (stating that ASRM represents American Society for
Reproductive Medicine).
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immoral behavior in the name of protecting the public good.9 Instead, it
sanctions the ethics of autonomy principled in the libertarian political
philosophy l of individualism." But if Devlin is correct, then forming a
consensus about the moral correctness of reproductive technologies would
be an important part of social acceptance. Labeling can be a key ingredient
in bringing about consensus because words shape attitudes and beliefs12 in
conformity with those who select the label or classification.
13
This article explores three sets of words that emerge as rallying points
for social acceptance. Each set has in some way been advanced with the
representation that it corresponds with protecting or promoting the "basic
freedom" of reproductive choice. 14  The ensuing discussion raises the
9. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 18S-19S (Supp. Sept. 1986) (hereinafter The
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I). This was reproduced almost verbatim in its
later Report. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of
the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 20S-21S (Supp. June 1990)
(hereinafter The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society II).
10. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 18S-20S; The
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at 2 1S-22S. Beneficence and
justice were also considered to be important ethical theories. Id. The advantage of starting with a
political philosophy or principled position is that there is greater overlapping consensus about those
than about moral theories, such as the moral status of the early embryo. See R. Alta Charo, The
Hunting of the Snark: The Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-Lifers, and Third World Women, 6
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, 12 (1995). A principle of autonomy that regards the freedom to choose
as the desired good conflicts with a natural law view of autonomy. See William E. May, Bioethics
and Human Life, in NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY 41,46 (David F. Forte ed.,
1998) (noting one must forebear from making a choice at odds with a moral norm).
11. See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 718-19 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(defining "political philosophy" wherein libertarianism was considered "committed to
individualism").
12. NOAM CHOMSKY, ON NATURE AND LANGUAGE 180 (Adriana Belletti & Luigi Rizzi eds.,
2002).
13. HAYAKAWA & HAYAKAWA, supra note 5, at 106-08. David Healy, a Professor of
Psychological Medicine is concerned that evidence-based medicine suffers from a similar
phenomenon of engineering consensus through distortion. David Healy, Manufacturing Consensus,
34 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 53 (July-Aug. 2004). He calls the state of affairs a "crisis," revealing
that marketing departments of drug manufacturers have, for the past twenty years, orchestrated
clinicians' views by failing to publish negative results or publishing "selected positive results." Id.
The persuasive effect of undisclosed "bad facts" is analogous to obscuring "bad facts" through
deceptive labeling.
14. See generally Robertson, supra note 3, at 446 (promoting the use of reproductive
technologies as "a basic freedom" that "translates easily into the language of individual rights"). He
labels as "modern traditionalist" those, like himself, who generally approve of reproductive
technologies with few limitations. Id. Robertson contrasts the "modern traditionalist" category with
the only other two positions offered: "strict traditionalist" and "radical liberty." Id. at 442-50. The
word "tradition" or "traditional" evokes feelings of security through repetition of a process,
methodology, or ideology. Values that are considered traditional generate a response that such
values ought to be protected because of society's long-standing recognition of their importance.
Values that are traditional are considered fundamental and worthy of Constitutional protection. See,
e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (finding constitutional rights to be "so rooted in
question of whether the labeling does, in fact, advance choice, or whether, as
John Finnis observes, the language is being used instrumentally to get the
collaboration of others.1
5
Part One traces the origin of the term "preembryo" and its infusion into
legal discourse. This classification was an important hallmark for the
acceptance of reproductive technologies because it oriented an isolation of
the extracorporeal embryo as a separate object from the more developed
embryo. 16 This enabled its devaluation and established the premise for later
exploitation possibilities. Part Two highlights emergency contraception
because of its recent consideration for over-the-counter purchases that would
be sanctioned by a federal agency and that would suggest a contra-
contraception function. Part Three considers terminology related to a
relatively new clinical feature on the ART 17 horizon, preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD). This section poses the problem of misconception about
PGD. The language used to portray the processes accompanying PGD fails
to convey a true picture of the process. The lack of understanding is likely
to encourage both use and acceptance rather than promote informed choice.
To compound the problem, there is a general lack of legal oversight over
PGD, which manipulates the early in vitro embryo. Acceptance would most
likely not have been possible without the normalization of a devalued
"preembryo."
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (finding fundamental rights as those "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history"). Thus, to the extent that the label "traditionalist" is used, it triggers thoughts of a
by-gone era where reproduction was associated with other "goods" and pre-dating the context of
technology into which it has been thrust. While the term "liberty" evokes enthusiasm, the modifier
"radical" removes it from reasonable consideration. "Strict" orients the audience to inflexibility,
rigidity, thereby also distancing those viewholders as unreasonable. Before understanding the
specific characteristics attributed to the position, the audience is already pre-disposed to embracing
the category (and the author's world view) of the "modem traditionalist" and rejecting the others.
The phenomenon of being guided by words alone enables others to intentionally (or unintentionally)
orient their audience by choosing words that give rise to the images desired by the chooser.
HAYAKAWA & HAYAKAWA, supra note 5, at 106-08, 145.
15. John Finnis, Unjust Laws in a Democratic Society: Some Philosophical and Theological
Reflections, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 595, 597 (1996) (finding this use of language particularly
where the selected terminology rallies around a seeming "common good" such as fundamental
rights).
16. See HAYAKAWA & HAYAKAWA, supra note 5, at 145. People permit themselves, by this
"intensional [sic] orientation," to be guided by words alone rather than facts that may give rise to the
words. Id. This enables words to be used (intentionally or unintentionally) as smokescreens or as
misevaluators. Id.
17. ART has come to denote "assisted reproductive technology," and is currently the preferred
representation for the acronym. Westlaw search conducted on July 14, 2004 (493 references in
journals and law reviews, 25 cases (the earliest of which was in 1996), texts, and bar journals). A
less popular, and probably earlier representation of ART was to "artificial reproductive technology."
Westlaw search conducted on July 14, 2004 (68 references in the law review and journals database
(with no reference in cases), the earliest article in each category being 1990).
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I. INVENTION
A. "Preembryo" and the Devaluation of the Early Extracorporeal Embryo
The word "preembryo" became a household legal term in the early
1990s. 18  Davis v. Davis,'9 a seminal case regarding the disposition of
cryopreserved embryos and the first American case to adopt the term, has a
20lot to do with its dissemination. In Davis, a couple wished to dissolve their
marriage after multiple unsuccessful attempts to produce biological children
through in vitro fertilization (IVF).2' Since seven healthy cryopreserved
conceptuses remained after their last attempt, the Tennessee trial court faced
a novel legal question of how it should dispose of them upon divorce.2  At
the root of the issue was how to classify the extracorporeal embryos that had
been produced during the marriage. If considered alive, then disposition
should reflect custody law; if considered property, then that law would
govern. 24 The term "preembryo" became the focal point because the label's
acceptance or nonacceptance symbolized the frozen entities' legal
characterization as life or property.25
To resolve the issue, the court relied on the testimony of the couple, who
agreed that their intent and purpose was to produce children by means of
IVF,26 and that of four expert witnesses. Drs. King and Shivers, a fertility
18. There have been at least 530 references to "preembryo" since 1990. Before 1990, the term
was referenced only a handful of times. Westlaw search conducted on Jan. 10, 2004. A more recent
case, Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998), also required judicial resolution regarding the
disposition of cryopreserved embryos following divorce. The issue differed significantly insofar as
the couple had signed an agreement in advance of cryopreservation that was to have settled any
later-arising dispute. See id. (affirming the disposition of the embryos in accord with the contractual
interpretation of two of the appellate judges).
19. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-94 (Tenn. 1992). The trial court rendered its decision
in 1989. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
20. Only a handful of law reviews used the term before Davis, while 80% of the more than 500
references to date refer to that case. Westlaw search conducted on July 8, 2004. So pervasive has its
use become that a student in my 2003 Family Law class "corrected" me when I used the term
"embryo" in connection with a case on surrogate agreements.
The first successful gestation following cryopreservation did not occur until 1983. Carl H.
Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to
Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 55 (1999).
21. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at*2-3.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id. (considering the root issue to be when human life began).
25. See id.
26. Id. at *20. Mrs. Davis testified further that she, unlike her husband, already viewed them as
children. Id. at *25.
27. ld. at 4.
specialist and embryologist who performed the fertility services for the
Davis couple, and John Robertson, a noted legal scholar, identified the
cryopreserved specimens as "preembryos" with just a "potential for life. 28
In support, these witnesses declared that cellular specialization was lacking
until after implantation and the formation of the primitive streak, an event
that occurred between ten and fourteen days after fertilization.29 Prof.
Robertson argued that since it was "not clear" that a unique individual had
been produced by fertilization, procreation had not yet occurred.
30
The fourth witness, Dr. Lejeune, a world-renowned geneticist, refuted
the others' testimony, asserting that there was no such word as "preembryo"
and that an embryo existed at the time of the first cellular division of the
fertilized egg.3' He noted that each cryopreserved specimen was genetically
unique, and that the fertilized ovum was "'the most specialized cell under
the sun"' because there was and would never be another cell like it.
32
Moreover, it alone contained all the instructions needed to form the unique
individual that it would become.33 Dr. Lejeune maintained that the embryo
was alive and human, and that no scientist had ever opined that an embryo
was property.34 He further accused the British of having invented the word
in order "to lead one to believe there is a difference between a preembryo
and an embryo when there is no such entity as a preembryo. 35
After hearing all the testimony, the trial court found that human
embryos were life and not property.36 Therefore, it applied domestic
relations law and awarded Mrs. Davis custody of the seven cryopreserved
conceptuses for the purpose of implantation.37 In reaching its decision, the
court found that "the term 'preembryo' serves as a false distinguishing
28. Id. at *34.
29. Id. at *4. As support, the witnesses noted that differentiation did not occur until ten to
fourteen days following fertilization, after implantation to the womb had occurred and the primitive
streak had formed. Id. The court noted that one witness, Prof. John Robertson, considered that life
did not commence until then. Id. Prof. John Robertson was, and is, a legal scholar who writes about
reproductive issues, and was, and is, a member of the American Fertility Society's Ethics
Committee. Id. at *20-21.
Dr. Irving Ray King was a reproductive endocrinologist who had treated Mary Sue Davis for six
years for infertility, and Dr. Charles Shivers was an embryologist who had worked with Dr. King
and the Davis's for at least three years. Id. at *2.4. Dr. Shivers conceded that genetic uniqueness
was determined at the time of fertilization, but asserted that there was no way to distinguish the cells
until after implantation and the appearance of the primitive streak at about fourteen days after
fertilization. Id. at *23-24.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *5, *27 (referencing a medical dictionary).
32. Id. at *5 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Lejeune).
33. Id. at *28.
34. Id. at. *5, *26-29. The three witnesses for Mr. Davis agreed that the entities were human, but
argued that they had only the "potential for life." Id. at *4.
35. Id. at *27 (mentioning the British, a clear reference to the Warnock Report, which was
referenced as authority by Prof. Robertson).
36. id.at*l,*7.
37. Id. at *1.
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term,"38 pointing out that both Dr. King and Prof. Robertson had referred to
the entities as "embryos" in their medical treatment notes and scholarly
article on the case, respectively.39 It also noted that Prof. Robertson's
testimony indicated that the American Fertility Society (AFS) Report, of
which he was a co-author and upon which the witnesses relied in advancing
the term, was meant as guidance for fertility specialists about the requisite
standard of care, primarily for litigation purposes.
40
The Tennessee high court rejected the findings of the trial court and
facilitated the destruction of the "preembryos. 41  The judge dismissed
Lejeune's testimony and favored the "scientific" testimony of King, Shivers,
and Robertson because their application of the term "preembryo" to a pre-
fourteen-day-old entity was consistent with a report by the AFS. 42 The high
court admonished the legal community to embrace the term "preembryo"
because it viewed the semantical separation from the more developed
embryo as legally significant.4 3 It was concerned that nonacceptance of the
term might influence judicial reasoning in a way that might harm IVF
programs." Having approved the AFS Report's terminology, the court then
adopted the Report's reasoning regarding the legal status of the "preembryo"
as person or property.4 5 In reaching its decision that "preembryos" should
be treated with "special respect" as urged in the AFS Report, the high court
disavowed its use of property law.46 But it did not explain how ordering the
destruction of the "preembryos" could be meaningfully reconciled with the
provision of "special respect.
'4 7
38. Id. at *6.
39. Id. at *7.
40. Id. at *5-7. See also The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9,
at iv (listing Prof. Robertson's membership on the committee authoring the report).
41. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). This was in accord with Junior Davis's
wish to no longer use them to procreate. Davis, 1989 WL 14095 at *20.
42. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593-94. The court announced its utilitarian objective in adopting the
testimony it branded "scientific" (securing the unfettered continuation of IVF operations). See id.
But it did not acknowledge the potential interests on the part of the experts that could have motivated
their position. See id. The court's acceptance of the proposed definition secured governmental non-
oversight of fertility practices. See Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate
Limits of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME I.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
157, 177 (2003) (where objectivity of scientific testimony is limited by conflicts of interest,
resistence to oversight, and a desire to push the envelope).
43. Id. at 592-93. The high court acknowledged that the popular press and legal journals referred
to cryopreserved specimen as "frozen embryos." Id. at 589.
44. Id. at 595.
45. Id. at 596-99.
46. Id. at 596-97, 598-602 (adopting the language of "special respect" and the right of
procreational autonomy); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV.
359, 416-17 (2000) (invoking the very property concepts the court sought to distance).
47. Janet Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells and Cloning, 19 ISSUES L. & MED.
The document treated as scientific authority for the Tennessee high
court's decision made multiple references to the term "preembryo. '48 The
AFS Report also specifically defined the term in its "Definitions" section,
which included only six terms altogether. 49 The report noted that: "In order
to avoid confusion, the Committee found it necessary to adopt certain
definitions for the purposes of this document."50
If the term "preembryo" had widespread acceptance and usage, why
would their readers, who were specialists in reproductive medicine, be
"confused" or require a specific identification and definition of the term?
Perhaps it was because the AFS itself utilized the term "embryo" elsewhere
to identify the products of in vitro fertilization.5' In a report it coauthored,
the AFS identified "embryos" as the pre-fourteen-day entities that were
considered for transfer to a human womb.52 In the same year, the AFS
published other articles that employed the term "embryos" to identify the
products of IVF - despite their developmental age of below fourteen days.53
Nature, a journal that keeps its readers informed about cutting edge
discoveries, also utilized the term "embryo" to refer to the entity that was a
mere four cells in size,54 which is at a developmental age far below fourteen
days.55 Perhaps the anticipated confusion stemmed from the fact that the
term "preembryo" was really adjectival, describing a stage of embryonic
development.56
203, 254 (2004) (asserting that "respect" talk was considered rhetoric because the embryos were
treated as commodities). Most commentators take the position that the IVF embryo is entitled to
"special respect" as neither person nor property. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 20, at 67. Some
characterize the duties owed as "heightened." Id. Others characterized them as meaningless. Lisa
Shaw Roy, Roe and the New Frontier, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339, 365 (2003).
48. See, e.g., The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at i
(referencing the term several times in the Table of Contents); The Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at i.
49. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at vii; The Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at vii.
50. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at vii; The Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at vii (asserting that "A preembryo is a
product of gametic union from fertilization to the appearance of the embryonic axis. The
preembryonic stage is considered to last until 14 days after fertilization .. "). The other terms
defined were couple, clinical trial, clinical experiment, egg (which was "used in a generic sense to
mean either an oocyte or an ovum in an unfertilized state"), and indication. Id.
51. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
52. See Medical Research International and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology,
The American Fertility Society, In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer in the United States: 1988
Results from the IVF-ET Registry, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 13 (Jan. 1990).
53. See, e.g., Soon-Chye Ng et al., Micromanipulation: Its Relevance to Human In Vitro
Fertilization, 53 FERTILrrY & STERILITY 203 (Feb. 1990). This article appeared in the "Modem
Trends" section of the journal with editorial attribution to Edward E. Wallach, who, as a member of
the AFS Ethics Committee, contributed to both its 1986 and 1990 Reports. The Ethics Committee of
the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at iv; The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society II, supra note 9, at iv.
54. Embryo Research, 344 NATURE, 19 April 1990, at 690.
55. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society n, supra note 9, at 31S-32S
56. See, e.g., Esther Slater McDonald, Patenting Human Life and the Rebirth of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1359, 1362 n.15 (2003) (citing RONAN O'RAHILLY &
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Prof. Robertson, a witness in the Davis case, recognized in his own
writings that early development signified a pre-embryonic "stage.,
57
Parenthetically, he noted, without reference, that the pre-embryonic stages
were "sometimes referred to as the conceptus or pre-embryo. '58 This glide
from adjective to noun artfully transformed a set of characteristics to an
entirely new object '9 - "pre-" instead of "part" of embryonic development.
Clifford Grobstein, also a co-author of the AFS Report, 60 took the same
approach in an earlier article.6' Responding to the HEW Secretary's
concerns about whether to fund IVF research, Grobstein advocated for the
FABIOLA MOOLLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 88 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that politics
rather than science was responsible for creating the scientifically rejected term "preembryo");
Amanda J. Smith, J.B. v. M.B.: New Evidence that Contracts Need to be Reevaluated as the Method
of Choice for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes, 81 N.C. L. REV. 878, 878 n.5 (2003) (citing
Glossary, in THE ETHics OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 347, 348 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992)
(asserting preembryo is a popular but not scientific term); Report of the Ethical Advisory Board of
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Concerning Research on In Vitro Fertilization,
reprinted in part in SOURCE BOOK IN BIOETHICS 88-89 (Albert R. Jonsen et al. eds., 1998) (using the
terms embryo and embryo transfer, but also using the terminology of "human ova fertilized"); Id. at
341; Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilization-
First Interim Report of the Waller Committee, Victoria, Australia, reprinted in part in SOURCE
BOOK IN BIOETHICS, id., at 343-45; Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and
Embryology: The Warnock Committee, United Kingdom, reprinted in part in SOURCE BOOK IN
BIOETHICS, id., at 347-48; WARNOCK, supra note 3, at xv. See also Clifford Grobstein, External
Human Fertilization, 240 ScI. AM., June 1979, at 57, 64-66 (noting that the stages of development
following fertilization were continuous, and recognizing the preembryonic phase as one of the
stages). During the preembryonic stage, the focal concentration of growth is on the formation of the
protective support tissues within which the embryo properly develops. The Ethics Committee of the
American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at 32S. Even the AFS acknowledges the continuity from
the moment of fertilization. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9,
at 26S (noting that where the zygote is alive and human, the process of growth is continuous, and
division by stages is for convenience); The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society II,
supra note 9, at 31S.
57. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 968 (1986). What was highlighted in cases such as
Davis was that conception and the early embryonic stage could be separated from gestation. See
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596-98 (Tenn. 1992). It may also have been because the IVF
manipulations and cryopreservation separated conception from internal gestation. Judith F. Daar,
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process: Developing an Equality Model to
Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 455, 458 (1999).
58. Robertson, supra note 57, at 968.
59. Naming something classifies it in accord with the convenience of the classifier, orienting the
audience to associations that are not necessarily accurate. HAYAKAWA & HAYAKAWA, supra note 5,
at 106-08, 145-46.
60. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at iv (listing
membership on the committee authoring the report). Prof. Kischer, an embryologist, states that
Clifford Grobstein invented the term "pre-embryo." C. Ward Kischer, There is No Such Thing as a
Pre-embryo, available at http://www.all.org/abac/cwk001.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). He also
points to the AFS, of which Grobstein was a Report author, as "instrumental in the revision of the
facts concerning Human Embryology." Id.
61. Grobstein, supra note 56, at 57, 60-64.
disbursement of federal research monies, recounting the potential impact of
IVF technology.62 Interest in the issue was generated by a funding proposal
that Pierre Soupart had submitted to the National Institutes of Health in the
1970s.63
Pierre Soupart was a medical researcher at the Vanderbilt University
School of Medicine who had requested federal funding for a laboratory
investigation of human fertilization.64 Approval of his proposal was delayed
to consider how to evaluate his proposal and others like it.65 Congress had
already established the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in response to reports of
research abuses.66 Guidelines that it generated were meant to assure that
subjects' interests were protected before funds could be approved.67 To
assist in this task, the Commission mandated the prior approval of a local
Institutional Review Board that would apply the guidelines.68 If the
experiments involved human subjects that were endangered by risks deemed
greater than "minimal," an additional review was required to be made by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW's) Ethics Advisory
Board (EAB). 69 The EAB would then advise the HEW Secretary as to
whether the proposal should be funded.70 IVF research proposals were
severely hampered by this structure because the Commission had also
validated the fetus as a human subject.7' Because IVF was still in its
62. Id. at 67.
63. Id. at 60-64. The Davis high court also cited Grobstein as authority, specifically noting that
language choice could impact legal rights. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592 & n. 11. The court also
acknowledged the influence of the AFS and other allied organizations. Id. at 594.
64. Grobstein. supra note 56, at 57.
65. See id.
66. Howard W. Jones, Jr., The USA Experience, in A TEXTBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION &
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE BOURN HALL GUIDE TO CLINICAL AND LABORATORY PRACTICE
441, 441 (Peter R. Brinsden ed., 2d ed. 1999) (providing an excellent history of the development of
IVF law).
67. See id.
68. Id. The guidelines in the Commission's 1975 report provided the basis of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare's research regulations, codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46. Dolgin, supra
note 2, at 138. Subpart A (sections 46.101-46.126) discusses the basic policy regarding the
protection of human subjects in research. Part B (sections 46. 201-46.211) lays out additional
constraints when fetuses, pregnant women, and human in vitro fertilization is involved. The
constraints are not limited to research; they extend to development and "related activities." 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.211 (2001).
69. See id.
70. STEPHEN S. HALL, MERCHANTS OF IMMORTALITY: CHASING THE DREAM OF HUMAN LIFE
EXTENSION 100 (2003). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) established the
EAB as its advisory body in 1977. Id. HEW became Health and Human Services. The Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at 8S. The National Institutes of
Health, to which Grobstein applied for funding, is within the purview of HHS (then HEW). June
Mary Zekan Makdisi, The Slide from Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research to Reproductive
Cloning: Ethical Decision-Making and the Ban on Federal Funding, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 463, 472
(2003).
71. HALL,supra note 70, at 100.
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infancy, IVF research always posed risks greater than "minimal. 72 This
finding triggered the additional scrutiny by the EAB and the personal
decision of the Secretary,73 who was always subject to political pressures.
In March 1979, the EAB concluded that the benefits of IVF research
outweighed the risks.74 It thereby determined that IVF research was
ethically acceptable and referred Pierre Soupart's proposal for funding
consideration. 7' As the proposal awaited the HEW Secretary's approval,
Grobstein published an article on human fertilization in which he hoped to
assuage HEW Secretary Joseph Califano's concerns regarding the propriety
of funding IVF research. 76  In his article, Grobstein urged that the pre-
implantation embryo was undeserving of the dignitary standards normally
applied to humans based on a lack of legal personhood coincidental to a
rudimentary stage of biological development.77
Grobstein identified the most problematic issue as "the question of the
stage in human development at which a 'person,' in the ethical and legal
sense, comes into being. '78 This presentation was a clever distraction from a
different rhetoric that found significant the distinction of life versus non-
life.79 Suggesting "personhood" as the relevant standard permitted the easy
application of the abortion standard that would support relative devaluation.
Focus on the constitutional issue, however, diverted attention away from the
fact that relative interests differed in the new context. In contrast with IVF
considerations, abortion issues necessarily triggered a devaluation of fetal
interests as they stood in conflict with the interests of a person already in
existence.
In advancing his argument, Grobstein asserted that extracorporeal
embryos were not persons primarily because they lacked both a conscious
awareness and a visual appearance of personhood, which Grobstein
suggested disabled them from evoking the necessary recognition and
72. Id.
73. Id. Federal regulations specifically required EAB approval of any proposals involving
human IVF. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society 11, supra note 9, at 8S (citing
45 C.F.R. § 46.204(a) (1984)).
74. See Grobstein, supra note 56, at 57.
75. Id. It bears mention that even the EAB referred to the IVF-formed entities as embryos. See
The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at 35S.
76. See Grobstein, supra note 56, at 60.
77. Id. at 64-66.
78. Id. at 64.
79. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 20, at 66-67 (describing the range of views). Some believe
that moral status (and thereby protection) attaches at the moment of fertilization. Charo, supra note
10, at 16. The author disagrees, in part because so many fertilized but unimplanted embryos never
fully develop. ld. This view makes no distinction between the passive and the intentional. For
example, it is inevitable that many children fall and skin their knees. That, however, does not excuse
another from intentionally causing one particular child to do so.
emotive response from other persons.80 Wedding his philosophy to biology,
Grobstein described the rudimentary developmental condition of the pre-
implantation embryo.8 I Although acknowledging the continuity of human
development that was marked by progressive stages once fertilization had
occurred,82 Grobstein utilized the same rhetorical device later employed by
Robertson in transforming a stage to an entity.83 Merging his arguments,
Grobstein declared that "[t]he stages involved not only are prepersons but
also are preembryos." 4
Ultimately, Soupert's research was not funded.85  The EAB was
dissolved by virtue of a sunset clause and was not reestablished. 6 Thus, no
IVF research could be publicly funded. Largely in response to the
dissolution of the EAB, the AFS convened an Ethics Committee to provide
guidelines for IVF research and experimentation. 7 The 1986 Report, which
was cited as authority in the Davis opinion,88 was a direct product of the
Committee's charge.
The AFS Report devoted most of its first thirty pages to discussing
American law and ethics in the context of reproductive technologies, the
bulk of which related in some way to IVF.89 One point was to demonstrate
that use of the new reproductive technologies could be viewed as ethical if
incorporated within the existing framework of reproductive liberty.90
80. Grobstein, supra note 56, at 64, 66. Interestingly, Dr. Grobstein did not consider someone in
an anencephalic baby a person. Id. at 64.
81. Id. at64.
82. Id. at 64-66.
83. Compare id. at 66, with Robertson, supra note 57, at 968.
84. Grobstein, supra note 56, at 66. The article then justified the terminology by describing
characteristics associated with the preembryonic stage of development, most notably, the ability to
split and develop into more than one embryo (twinning). Id. at 66-67.
85. Hall, supra note 70, at 101
86. Id.
87. Jones, supra note 66, at 442. The author was another AFS Ethics Committee member who
contributed to the 1986 and 1990 reports. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I,
supra note 9, at iv; The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society H, supra note 9, at iv.
88. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593-94 (Tenn. 1992).
89. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at I S-31 S. This
was essentially repeated in its later Report. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society II, supra note 9, at 1S-36S.
90. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 3S-5S, 7S. This
was reproduced almost verbatim in its later Report. See The Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at 3S-5S, 7S. Reproduction decisions have already been
recognized as fundamental outside the IVF context. Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating
Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 45 (2000) (distinguishing the protection of
privacy under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) and the protection of liberty under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
Commentators such as Robertson believe the scope of the constitutional protection should be
sufficiently broad to encompass IVF technologies. Andrews & Elster, supra. The rhetoric of
procreative choice has generally been characterized as a negative right to be free from governmental
intervention. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Cloning and Positive Liberty, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 15, 16 (1999) (regarding cloning where there is a virtually absolute negative freedom of
the adult to procreate with little regard for any "positive freedom of the child to come into
[Vol. 32: 1, 2004] Genetically Correct
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Significantly, this dovetailed with AFS's view of a governmental role that
was essentially limited to financially supporting the research, safeguarding
the right to exploit the preembryo, and protecting the interests of IVF
embryos that were designated as potential future offspring.91  Further,
adopting the "intermediary" moral view of the IVF embryo provided for a
low threshold of duties that would be owed, and easily outweighed by the
competing interests of decision-makers and researchers.92 Attaching a label
of "preembryo" symbolized the separateness of the IVF embryo and
reinforced the legal and ethical distinctions urged.93 The utilitarian adoption
of the term "preembryo" simultaneous with a minimization of its legal
interests could thereby eliminate the barriers to research and clinical practice
and lay the groundwork for eventual funding.94
The utilitarian approach was also taken in the Warnock Report,95 which
had influenced John Robertson, an instrumental witness in the Davis case.96
Similar to Robertson, authors of the Warnock Report took the position that if
the benefits of embryonic research were real, then it should be performed.97
Therefore, a legal framework was necessary to assure that only certain
conduct would be criminalized. Their vision was to define the parameters,
existence"); Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a Public Health Problem: Why Assisted Reproductive
Technologies are Not the Answer, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89, 91 (1995).
91. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 18S-19S ("A
third view . . .[a]pplied to the new reproductive technologies... might include infertility treatment
within the scope of guaranteed minimum health services."). Views that the role of government was
limited were unchanged in the later Report. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society 11, supra note 9, at 21S. Robertson advanced similar views on reproductive liberty in his
legal scholarship. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 57, at 953-67, 971-73. A vision of governmental
non-interference is consistent with a general view of researchers. Condic & Condic, supra note 42,
at 177 (noting a reluctance to accept oversight).
92. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 16S-18S. Very
little was added to its later Report. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society H,
supra note 9, at 17S-18S. Listed competing interests were the fertility specialist's duties to provide
care to infertile clients, also deemed to include performing underlying research that would lead to
such care. Id.
93. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 76S-78S.
94. Id. In its summary of special points of interest, the AFS Ethics Committee noted that the
AFS community should persuade the HHS to revise its policies and encourage funding. Id. at 78S.
95. WARNOCK, supra note 3, at xvi.
96. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *21 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(referencing the Warnock Report); Robertson, supra note 57, at 972, 1035 & n.328. Robertson
aligned himself with Grobstein in complaining about the interference of right-to-lifers in the embryo
status issue and advocating the formation of a body committed to defining "currently acceptable
standards of conduct with embryos." Id. at 1034. It is here that Robertson affirms the Warnock
Report's approach. See id. at 1034-35. The consequence of going directly to the standards issue is
that the primary issue of whether the embryo was a proper subject for risky manipulations was
addressed only in the utilitarian view. Other principled positions - namely the deontological
perspective of the right-to-lifers - was ignored as "political" interference. See id.
97. See WARNOCK, supra note 3, at xv, xvi.
regulate standards of research conduct, and license.98 Formation of the
HFEA was a consequence of their vision.
In adopting a working definition of what embryonic age should be
acceptable as a subject of research, the Warnock Committee considered a
variety of time lines. 99 Significantly, the entity itself was always considered
alive, human, and an "embryo" that was in a continuing process of growth
from the moment of conception.'00  Despite the recognition that any
apportionment was arbitrary, the Committee calculated that a bright line
determination was necessary "in order to allay public anxiety."
10
'
By relying on the above referenced works, the opinion rendered in
Davis mainstreamed the "preembryo" label into legal discourse as well as
the analytical structure generated by the philosophical bias of the AFS.
1 °2
Unnoticed by those not well versed in developmental biology was the
invention of the term by its transformation from an adjective to a noun.'0 3
98. WARNOCK, supra note 3, at xvi, 64.
99. ld. at 65-66. Suggestions for the significant cut-off point included the time of implantation
since unimplanted blastocysts would not further develop, Id. at 60, the time that the primitive streak
appeared, marking the early development of the embryo proper and the end of potential twinning at
day fifteen, called "individuation," Id. at 59, 66, day twenty-two or twenty-three when the central
nervous system began formation; or at the time the embryo was known to feel pain, which was far
later, Id. at 65.
100. Id. at xiv, xv, 65. Committee members agreed that
[Oince the process has begun, there is no particular part of the developmental process
that is more important than another; all are part of a continuous process. . . . Thus
biologically there is no one single identifiable stage in the development of the embryo
beyond which the in vitro embryo should not be kept alive.
Id. at 65. While conceding the arbitrariness of any particular stage or developmental age chosen as
acceptable for research purposes, the concession also lays the groundwork for a future consideration
of pushing the limits on the fourteen-day standard set by the Committee. See, e.g., id. at 71 (offering
as an example ectogenesis, the use of an artificial uterus to create a child wholly in vitro). Grobstein
anticipated ectogenesis for the provision of replacement organs, but urged that such matters not be
considered until technology forced their consideration. Grobstein, supra note 56, at 67. Instead, the
author pressed for guidelines that enabled funding for fertilization and preimplantation research. Id.
The AFS adopts a bright-line fourteen-day rule, attributing the choice to a host of reasons
characteristic of the fourteen-day preembryonic stage of development. The Ethics Committee of the
American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 27S. This carves out boundaries for what the Society
considers as current ethical practice. See id. At the same time, it merges this time frame with a legal
conclusion. It promotes the tenuous "respect" if selected for research, and a vague "concern beyond
respect" if chosen for implantation. See id. at 28S. Yet, in a footnote, it notes the uncertainty of
determining the precise time a particular developmental age is reached. Id. at 26S.
101. WARNOCK, supra note 3, at xv-xvi, 65.
The point was not however the exact number of days chosen, but the absolute necessity
for there being a limit set on the use of embryos, in terms of a number of days from
fertilisation [sic]. In this way the law would be clear. If the limitation on research were
set in terms of stage of development or the capacity of the embryo to feel pain, then these
limits might be subject to dispute. If the limit is in terms of days, on the other hand, this
is a simple matter of counting, and there can be no dispute.
Id. at xv-xvi. The selection of a bright-line fourteen-day rule for permissive exploitation of the
embryo was considered a "political compromise." Charo, supra note 10, at 12 (regarding the Human
Embryo Research Panel's adoption of that view).
102. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (using the term "preembryo" as a
noun).
103. See id.
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Significantly, the conversion created an illusion that "preembryo" intimated
before human embryonic life, rather than a stage of human embryonic life.
Invoking the authority of science as a premise for its legal determination
thereby enabled the Davis court to create a new construct and a new social
norm.104 Additionally, because the "preembryo" became separated from
"embryo," it could be withdrawn from visible moral controversy. 10 5 As a
result, researchers and others who wished to benefit by its exploitation could
be distanced from legal liability and psychologically freed of guilt.
10 6
The AFS was thereby successful, by the Davis court's acceptance of its
term, in "providing disseminated knowledge of [its reproductive]
positions"' 10 7 and in beginning "to create a social structure"' 108 that would
104. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of
Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1205, 1290 (1992). The law's defaulting to science not only results in normalizing the
scientific values, it alters the concept of choice. Id. There are other instances of the law's adoption
of categories based on purported biological truths where there was no underlying biological truth to
the category, or where it was ambiguous. But the adoption established the inevitable path of
acceptance. See R. Alta Charo, Biological Truths and Legal Fictions, I J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 301, 305, 314 (1998) (noting the problems of defining life in reproductive biology).
105. Robertson argued for this. See generally Robertson, supra note 57, at 939. The AFS
acknowledged that carving out a preembryo and assigning it a different status affected its social
treatment - in particular, defining a physician's liability and freedom to manipulate. The Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society 1, supra note 9, at 26S, 29S; The Ethics Committee of
the American Fertility Society 11, supra note 9, at 31 S, 34S.
106. This parallels the reasoning behind characterizing IVF embryos as having only "potential
life." One commentator notes the blatant circular reasoning: A human being is not protectable in the
early stages of development because, as the Report claims,
It has no potential for further development. But in the case of the embryo produced in the
laboratory, it has no potential for further development for the sole reason that researchers
will not protect it. Because they wish to use it, they do not protect it; because they do not
protect it, its natural potential for development is destroyed; because it thus 'has no
potential,' it is declared 'not protectable.'
The Ramsey Colloquium, supra note 1, at 129. See also Kevin P. Quinn, The Politics of Embryonic
Discourse, 36 CONN. L. REv. 1163 (2004). Erroneously segmenting the pre-implantation and post-
implantation stages of the human embryo such that a new definition of embryo has been created
orients away from answering the difficult moral questions, enables instrumentation of nascent
human life, and permits society to "mask that fact from itself." Id. at 1164, 1165, 1167.
107. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at iii; The Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at iii. If there was no wrongdoing
(because it was only "pre-"), then there would be no reason for the government to intervene to
prohibit the conduct. Although some in society might consider the conduct immoral, the AFS rejects
the role of government as protective of public morals. The Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 18S- 19S; The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
1I, supra note 9, at 20S-21S. Rather, governmental intervention is "to prevent substantial harm to
offspring, for example, by requiring donor screening .. " The Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 19S; The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society II,
supra note 9, at 21S. This view of the government's role supports one of the ethical decision-
making principles adopted by the Committee: beneficence, or its corresponding negative aspect: "do
no harm," The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 19S, The
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at 21S, or nonmalificence.
accept the naturalness of technical manipulation in the reproductive sphere.
The court itself made a legal determination premised on the acceptance of a
political view that was in the guise of medical terminology.' °9 The assertion
that the court had grounded its decision in science thereby promoted its
acceptance as unquestioned truth."
Since the Davis decision, the term "preembryo" has been discredited."'
Prof. Annas notes that almost no one uses the term, which he characterizes
as euphemistic." 2 In legal literature, nevertheless, the term remains quite
visible."l 3 The concept of separateness that the term helped create is now
BARRY R. FURROW Er AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 4 (4th ed. 2001). Since no
harm is done, the government may not interfere, and the utilitarian ethical theory tied with the
principle governs permissible conduct. Id.
108. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society I, supra note 9, at 16S; The Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society II, supra note 9, at 17S.
109. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-94 (Tenn. 1992) ("The Scientific Testimony").
Misguided use of the prefix "pre-" has been judicially adopted by another court in determining the
disposition of cryopreserved embryos. In Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998), the state high
court adopted the term "pre-zygotes" to refer to the pre-implantation cryopreserved embryos and
accepted the definition supplied by the party's brief: "We use the parties' term 'pre-zygotes,' which
are defined in the record as 'eggs which have been penetrated by sperm but have not yet joined
genetic material."' Id. at 175 n.1. The definition suggests a lack of moral controversy since the
subject of the disposition would not have reached an embryonic existence. Once the court begins to
use the term in context, however, it becomes clear that the term is applied far more broadly than the
confines of the offered definition. The court relates: "Once a sperm cell fertilizes the egg, this
fusion-or pre-zygote--divides until it reaches the four- to eight-cell stage, after which several pre-
zygotes are transferred to the woman's uterus by a cervical catheter." Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
Use of the term "pre-zygote" to refer to pre-implantation embryos necessarily means that mixing of
genetic material has already occurred.
The blame for the misrepresentation may have originated with the clinic that produced the
cryopreserved embryos. The term appeared in the clinic's consent form, despite acknowledging (in
its consent form) that insemination would have already occurred. Id. at 176.
What Kass illustrates is that euphemistic terminology is being utilized by medical professionals
in a manner that could interfere with a client's clear understanding about the nature of his and her
reproductive decisions (regarding the disposition of their joined gametic material - i.e. embryos). It
also demonstrates how such misleading terminology is adopted and applied in the judicial sphere.
Confusion also exists in legislative provisions. State statutes may be inconsistent in their
definitions and usage of various ART terms. Unfortunately, this may lead to a lack of understanding
of what, exactly is protected by the provisions. Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating
Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 30 (2003).
110. See Ikemoto, supra note 104, at 1293.
111. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 20, at 55 n.1 (citing Richard A. McCormick, Who or What Is
the Preembryo?, KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 1 (1991)) (political term); McDonald, supra note 56,
at 1362 n.15 (citing O'RAHILLY & MOOLLER, supra note 56, at 88) (noting that politics rather than
science was responsible for creating the scientifically rejected term "preembryo"); Smith, supra note
56, at 878 n.5 (citing Glossary, in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 56, at
348 (asserting preembryo is a popular but not scientific term)).
112. George J. Annas, The Shadowlands - Secrets, Lies, and Assisted Reproduction, 339 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 935, 937 (1998).
113. There have been at least 530 references to "preembryo" since 1990. Westlaw search
conducted on January 10, 2004. More than half the references were made since 1998, and at least 40
references were made within the last year. Westlaw search conducted Jan. 10, 2004. Some
renowned legal scholars have reverted to use of the term "embryo" to describe the post-fertilization
entity, but continue to assert that the term "preembryo" is "technically more accurate." See, e.g.,
Daar, supra note 57, at 455 & n.4.
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part of the analytical structure that makes the acceptance of reproductive
technology in conjunction with manipulation and destruction of the early
embryo palatable." 
4
II. REDEFINITION
A. "Emergency Contraception" and the Devaluation of the Early
Incorporeal Embryo
The term "emergency contraception" reflects a sense of urgency. It
conveys a mood of necessity and impending disaster and demands remedy.
It also suggests that the contraceptive consequences of the act generating the
"emergency" can be prevented by the proposed antidote, commonly known
as the morning-after pill or Plan B." 5  In 1997, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) encouraged drug manufacturers to submit
applications for approval of new products labeled for use as "postcoital
emergency contraception." '"1 6  In support of the announcement, the FDA
noted that active ingredients - estrogens, progestins, or a combination of
hormones - had been used off-label to prevent pregnancy for some time.,"
7
Since then, the FDA has not only approved new drugs for use as
"emergency contraceptives," ' 1 8 it has funded studies on the use of
114. See Carl H. Coleman, supra note 20, at 55 n.I (citing McCormick, supra note 111, at I
(discussing use of the term "preembryo" "as an exercise of linguistic engineering to make human
embryo research more palatable to the general public")).
115. Ellen Goodman, Let Science, Not Politics, Decide on Plan B; Contraception, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 27, 2004, at 27A, available at http://www.herald.com.
116. Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for Use as Postcoital
Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg. 8610-01 (Feb. 25, 1997). While the FDA usually waits for
manufacturers to seek drug approval, it took an active role in seeking applications to market RU-
486, DES, and "emergency contraception." Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval
Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 578
(2001).
117. Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for Use as Postcoital
Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8610-01 (section I). The FDA referenced then-current
literature that stated that clinical trials indicated a range of effectiveness of 55.3% to 94.2%. Id.
Rounding to an effectiveness average of 74%, the FDA explained what the statistic meant as
follows: If 100 women ingested the "emergency contraception" treatment following sexual
intercourse during the potentially fertile second or third week of their menstrual cycle, only two
would be expected to become pregnant. Id. If those same 100 women had foregone the hormonal
treatment, eight women would be expected to become pregnant. Id. In short, use of emergency
contraception drops the chances of pregnancy from 8% to 2%.
118. Contraception; FDA Considers Over-the-Counter "Morning After" Pill, MEDICAL LETTER
ON THE CDC & FDA 20, Dec. 21, 2003, 2003 WL 8984229 (stating Plan B and Preven have been
approved for marketing since 1998.) Preven was approved by the FDA in 1998 and Plan B in 1999.
FDA's Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and Answers, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugl
infopage/planB/planBQandA.htm. The two drugs' active ingredient differs. Preven contains
emergency contraceptives by young adults," 9 and moved toward the
approval of their use without a prescription. 20  When its Nonprescription
Drugs Advisory Committee and Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory
Committee approved their over-the-counter availability in December
2003,121 supporters took the FDA committee's action to be "a very clear
message.., that emergency contraception is basic birth control....,, 22  As
the central disseminator of information concerning medical technologies,
123
the imprimatur of the FDA has a powerful influence over consumers.
Despite the Committee's approval of the over-the-counter sale of
emergency contraception, in May 2004 the FDA informed Barr Research,
the sponsors of Plan B, that it could not approve their application for non-
prescription use. 124 The FDA's primary concern was the effect of over-the-
levonorgestrel plus ethinyl estradiol (an example of the Yuzpe regimen). Administrative
Documents, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Application Number: NDA 21045, at 2, at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/99/21-045_Plan%20Badmindocs.pdf. Plan B contains
levonorgestrel alone. Plan B Advisory Committee Meeting Agenda (Dec. 16, 2003) (Introduction),
at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/4015B 1_04_FDA-Tab%20 1-Plan%20B%
20Points%20.pdf.
One of the problems inherent in the FDA approval process is its reliance on industry-paid user
fees. The revenues generated by the fees provide greater than fifty percent of budget of the FDA's
Drug Evaluation Office. A former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, Arnold
Relman, professor emeritus of the Harvard Medical School, deems this to be an "inherent conflict"
of interest. Catherine Hollingsworth, Industry's Control of Clinical Trials In Need of Change,
Conference Told, 2 PHARMACEUTICAL L. & INDUSTRY 799, 799-800 (July 16, 2004). To resolve the
conflict, Relman suggests that the FDA office be tax-payer funded instead. Id.
119. Communication and Negotiation About Barrier Contraceptive Use Among Young Adults at
Risk; Notice of Availability of Funds, 68 Fed. Reg. 15191-02 (March 28, 2003).
120. Contraception; FDA Considers Over-the-Counter "Morning After" Pill, supra note 118.
121. Tony Pugh, FDA Panels Back Morning-After Pill, KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 17, 2003, at 1;
Letter from Steven Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Dr.
Joseph Carrado, Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs, Barr Research, Inc., (May 6, 2004) (FDA Not
Approvable Letter, NDA 21-045/S-011), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/planB/planB-
NALetter.pdf; Press Release, FDA News, FDA Issues Not Approvable Letter to Barr Labs; Outlines
Pathway for Future Approval (May 7, 2004), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/
NEW01064.html.
122. Pamela Stallsmith, Disputed Pills on Legislative Agenda Proposals on Morning-After
Contraception Could Be Hard Sells Since Rejections Have Come Before, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2003, at B (quoting Bennet Greenberg, a lobbyist for Planned Parenthood
Advocates of Virginia) (emphasis added). A consolidated group calling itself the Consortium for
Emergency Contraception has been committed to having EC be seen as standard birth control since
1996. Anna Glasier, Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED., Oct. 9, 1997, at
1058, 1063.
123. Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the
Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 435 (2002) (discussing evidence-based medicine).
124. Letter from Steven Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
to Dr. Joseph A. Carrado, Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs, Barr Research, Inc., supra note 121.
The original over-the-counter application was submitted in April 2003 by Women's Capital
Corporation, the same group that had gained FDA approval in July 1999. Plan B Advisory
Committee Meeting Agenda, supra note 118. Capital transferred sponsorship to Barr Research in
November 2003, just the month before the joint FDA committee meeting that would decide Plan B's
approval. Study #9728: Plan B OTC Label Comprehension Study, medical officer addendum, at l,
at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/4O15B106FDA-Tab%202-2-Label%
20Conprehension%2OStudy.doc.
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counter availability on adolescent children under the age of sixteen. 125 Lack
of sufficient data on the safety of the drug for that consumer age group stood
in the way. 126 Based on the explanation in the "Not Approvable" letter from
the acting director of the FDA, however, it is clear that the issue is far from
closed. 127  Steven Galson, Acting Director of FDA's Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, affirmed the FDA's support of the initiative,
calling the non-prescription availability of emergency contraception "an
important incremental step forward in contraceptive availability., 128  Dr.
Galson offered specific recommendations on how to cure the infirmities in
the application 29 and suggested that it anticipated future approval of over-
the-counter availability by its commitment to "working toward the
expeditious evaluation of Barr's response to the Not Approvable letter.,1 30
Approval has been moving forward despite a 2001 FDA study revealing
that, contrary to the expressed objective that EC was to be understood for
use only as a back up, fully one third of the subjects tested considered Plan
B to be a substitute for other contraceptive methods.13' That is, as endorsed
by a Planned Parenthood advocate, EC was regarded as "basic birth
125. Press Release, FDA News, FDA Issues Not Approvable Letter to Barr Labs; Outlines
Pathway for Future Approval, supra note 121. The FDA will not approve use without demonstrable
results from controlled clinical trials. Noah, supra note 123, at 435.
126. Press Release, FDA News, FDA Issues Not Approvable Letter to Barr Labs; Outlines
Pathway for Future Approval, supra note 12 1.
127. See Letter from Steven Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, to Dr. Joseph Carrado, Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs, Barr Research, Inc., supra
note 121 (providing encouragement on amending the application and information on how to gain
approval).
128. Press Release, FDA News, FDA Issues Not Approvable Letter to Barr Labs; Outlines
Pathway for Future Approval, supra note 121.
129. Letter from Steven Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
to Dr. Joseph Carrado, Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs, Barr Research, Inc., supra note 121.
Approval for over-the-counter sales required that the sponsors provide data that confirmed the safety
to the under-sixteen population or, in the alternative, to furnish a package and labeling design that
would be uniform for both groups: the under-sixteen with prescription users and the sixteen and
older over-the-counter users. Id. At no time was there a suggestion that EC should or would be
made unavailable for adolescent use, notwithstanding the insufficient safety data. Id.
130. Press Release, FDA News, FDA Issues Not Approvable Letter to Barr Labs; Outlines
Pathway for Future Approval, supra note 121.
131. Study #9728: Plan B OTC Label Comprehension Study, medical officer addendum, supra
note 124, at 10 (Table 4). Answers to five separate questions that were designed to test consumer
understanding of the following communication objective: "Plan B is intended as a back up method
and should not be used for regular contraception." Id. at 3. Breaking down the statistic further,
subjects' understanding that EC was to be used as a back up fell to 57% in the twelve to seventeen
age group, of which there were seventy-six subjects. Id. at 12. Just over half (55%) of the 178
subjects whose educational level was below a high school degree understood that EC was for back
up only. Id. at 13. Not surprisingly, of those who had a literacy level of eighth grade or lower (139
out of 393), less than half (46%) understood that EC was not a contraceptive substitute. Id. at 14.
The statistics were derived from a study conducted from June 18, 2001 - July 18, 2001. Id. at I.
control."' 13 2 Given the widespread misunderstanding about Plan B's primary
use and its promotion as a contraceptive, 3 3 legally approved under the rubric
of "emergency contraception" or "EC,"' 34 a discussion of its contraceptive
nature is warranted, particularly in light of Plan B's anticipated availability
without a prescription. 135 At stake is the ability of potential users to make an
informed choice about whether Plan B is right for them.
Unlike other methods, Plan B is employed after intercourse.
136
Therefore, it may have particular appeal to the "occasional sex" consumer
for use as an alternative to pre-intercourse regimens. For example, Plan B
may be embraced as a means of avoiding the long-term risks associated with
daily birth-control pills. 13 7 Or, it could be welcomed as a positive alternative
to the "turn-off" of prophylactic devices that often interrupt and that must be
on hand at the precise moment of need. If all the regimens similarly prevent
conception, then the choice of alternative could be based on those other
secondary criteria.
But what if some methods only frustrated the sperm's ability to fertilize
while others could operate after the formation of an embryo, preventing its
continued development? The distinction between those two operative
functions may be paramount because some consider the former to be
contraceptive and the latter to be abortifacient.
13
132. See Stallsmith, supra note 122 at B 1.. In fact, one of the reasons that EC has been promoted
for over-the-counter availability is for weekend use among young people. See Glasier, supra note
122, at 1063; Hanna Klaus, The Case Against Plan B, 29 ETHICS & MEDICS 3, 3-4 (March 2004)
(expressing concerns about the rise in STDs in the targeted group coincidental to EC availability and
the unchanged abortion statistic that was promised as a benefit of EC).
133. See supra note 131.
134. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA's Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and
Answers, supra note 118.
135. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 132.
137. Theoretically, however, EC also poses risks of stroke or other thrombotic events. Carolyn
Westhoff, Emergency Contraception, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED., Nov. 6, 2003, at 1830, 1832.
138. See Roberto Rivera et al., The Mechanism of Hormonal Contraceptives and Intrauterine
Contraceptive Devices, 181 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1263, 1267 (Nov. 1999)
(addressing the issue as considered important because some consider pregnancy to begin with
fertilization); Horacio Croxatto et al., Mechanism of Action of Hormonal Preparations Used for
Emergency Contraception: A Review of the Literature, 63 CONTRACEPTION I 11, 111 (2001) (noting
that EC's function is important to some users "because of sensitive ethical issues"); Kevin T.
McMahon, Why Fear Ovulation Testing? 28 ETHICS & MEDICS 3, 3 (June 2003) (citing Directive
36, under which medications preventing ovulation, sperm capacitation or fertilization are acceptable
while those whose purpose or direct effect is removing or destroying a fertilized egg, or interfering
with its implantation are unacceptable).
Some consider that implantation must have occurred before abortion is possible. Rivera et al.,
supra. This coincides with a social definition of pregnancy as beginning with implantation. Glasier,
supra note 122, at 1063. Glasier states that "[tihe prevention of pregnancy before implantation is
contraception and not abortion." Id. The passage concedes that pregnancy has already been
established by parsing out as relevant only post-implantation pregnancy. See id. Piggy-backing onto
this rationale is that "even compounds known to interrupt established pregnancy cannot dislodge an
implanted embryo, because implantation would not have occurred yet." Id. Therefore, bold
statements about EC's operative function conceal the presence of a pre-implantation embryo. See,
e.g., Susana Hayward, Morning-After Pill Endorsed, Stirs Fury, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 31, 2004, at
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Because of these differences in opinion about the morality of interfering
with the development of early embryos, labeling multiple functions under a
common terminology of "contraception"'' 39 burdens a decision-maker's
ability to properly weigh and balance the birth control alternatives and select
one that fits their personal beliefs. The encumbrance is hardly irrelevant or
insignificant. What value can there be in ascribing constitutional protection
to reproductive decisions 14° if the information necessary to the decision is
obfuscated?
To resolve this issue in the context of Plan B, it is essential to disclose
the manner in which births are controlled. Whether the drug is acceptable
for personal use may very well depend upon the mechanism by which it
works. 141 Not all EC or birth control pills are alike. 142  Some combined
hormonal regimes work primarily to inhibit ovulation and thereby prevent
12A ("Critics think it's an abortion pill, but it's not, because if a woman is already pregnant it won't
work.").
On the other hand, when the classical definitions are used for pregnancy and conception, the
effect may be considered abortifacient. See Kevin T. McMahon, supra, at 4 (asserting that
interference after fertilization is abortifacient). In the moral context, which is particularly relevant to
consumers who must choose from alternatives, the interval between fertilization and implantation
would be considered abortifacient because it terminates embryonic life. Teresa Stanton Collett,
Heads, Secularists Win; Tails, Believers Lose - Returning Only Free Exercise to the Political
Process, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 689, 707 (1998) (quoting NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES,
45 (1994)).
Even if one were to argue that the term "abortifacient" overstates insofar as it includes an
interference with an embryo's growth prior to implantation, it does so no more than the term
"contraception," which includes a post-fertilization interference. The dispute over the proper
terminology represents a divide in personal and religious beliefs about what moral duties are owed to
the pre-implantation embryo.
139. The FDA permits each of the following drug effects to be labeled as contraceptive: delaying
or inhibiting ovulation, inhibiting fertilization, or inhibiting implantation because of the drugs'
alteration of the endometrium. Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives
for Use as Postcoital Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8610-01 (section I.A).
140. Reproduction decisions have already been recognized as fundamental outside the IVF
context. Andrews & Elster, supra note 90, at 45 (distinguishing the protection of privacy under
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and the
protection of liberty under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
141. See Rivera et al., supra note 138, at 1263 (recognizing that the mechanism by which the drug
works will determine whether it will be acceptable).
142. See Office of Population Research at Princeton Univ. & Assoc. of Reproductive Health
Professional, Emergency Contraceptive Pills, The Emergency Contraceptive Website (last revised
April 2003), at http://ec.princeton.edu/info/ecp.htm. For even easier access, the alternate website
address has been linked to an attitude: http://www.not-2-late.com. The website was established by
the Reproductive Health Technologies Project and the Office of Population Research at Princeton
University to provide information that would increase access to EC. Melissa Sanders Wanner &
Rachel L. Couchenour, Hormonal Emergency Contraception, 22 PHARMACOTHERAPY 43, 51
(2002). A toll-free number was also established by the group. Glasier, supra note 122, at 1063. Its
purpose, like that of the website, was to promote the use of EC. Making people aware of its ease of
availability was a means to that end. Id.
the possibility of fertilization.'43 Plan B, on the other hand, is a progestin-
only regimen whose active ingredient is levonorgestrel.'" Its use in an EC
regimen is thought to cause critical alterations to the endometrium that
present an obstacle to implantation. 4 5 Since fertilization may follow rapidly
after intercourse during the most fertile phase of a woman's cycle,
146
administration of Plan B during this time would not be likely to prevent
fertilization. Instead, it would more likely prevent a newly-formed embryo
from implanting. 147 Because of its mechanism to restrict existing embryonic
life rather than to prevent its formation, Plan B would be repugnant to some
consumers, if they were made aware of this operative function.
Use of the term "contraception" that does not alert a woman to a post-
fertilization meaning has not come about by accident. As oral
contraceptives began to find a market in the mid 1960s, 14 concerted
attempts were made by influential medical groups to alter long-standing
definitions associated with reproduction. 149  Following the Second
International Conference on Intra-Uterine Contraception in 1964, the
143. The daily oral contraceptive regimen (generally known as birth control pills or The Pill)
contains several hormones in combination. Office of Population Research at Princeton Univ. &
Assoc. of Reproductive Health Professionals, supra note 142. Estrogen and progestin are combined
because using them together inhibits ovulation to a much greater extent than the use of either
hormone alone. Rivera et al., supra note 138, at 1264.
The contraceptive method is not foolproof, however. When following the estrogen-progestin
combination regimen, twenty-eight daily doses are followed by seven days without the hormones.
Id. During these seven days, the absence of those hormones permits FSH and LH secretions to
occur, thereby providing the possibility of fertility and with it, a risk of pregnancy. Id. To further
avoid that result, some manufacturers of birth control pills have recently added other ingredients. Id.
144. Wanner & Couchenour, supra note 142, at 44; Office of Population Research at Princeton
Univ. & Assoc. of Reproductive Health Professionals, supra note 142. Lenonorgestral, Plan B's
regimen, only partially suppresses ovulation. Rivera et al., supra note 138, at 1264 (noting that
about 40% of women still ovulate, thereby providing ripened eggs).
145. Croxatto et al., supra note 138, at 116-17; Rivera et al, supra note 138, at 1265-67 (asserting
that although human data is hard to obtain, changes in the endometrium suggest hindrance of
implantation); Glasier, supra note 122, at 1060 (asserting that although human data is hard to obtain
animal data indicates that implantation is inhibited).
146. Ralph P. Miech, Over-the-Counter Abortion, 29 ETHICS & MEDICS 1, 2 (2004). During the
fertile period of the cycle, sperm can migrate from the cervix to the distal end of the fallopian tube in
five minutes. Id. (referencing DONALD R. COUSTAN, RAY V. HANING, JR., & DON B. SINGER,
HUMAN REPRODUCTION: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (1995)).
147. See Croxatto et al., supra note 138, at 117 (noting that the timing of Plan B's administration
during the menstrual cycle was seen as relevant to its operative function); Rivera et al., supra note
138, at 1265-66 (noting that the operative function may vary depending upon when during the cycle
it is administered and where ACOG acknowledged that EC has effect post fertilization); Wanner &
Couchenour, supra note 142, at 44 (noting that mechanisms vary in accord with when used); Glasier,
supra note 122, at 1059 (asserting that there is no direct evidence that EC prevents fertilization.).
Thus, if ovulation has already occurred and the ripened egg fertilized, the embryo has nowhere to
attach for continued development because the drug has disabled implantation. See Ron Hamel, Rape
and Emergency Contraception, 28 ETHICS & MEDICS 1 (2003). Some call this effect abortifacient.
Miech, supra note 146, at 2.
148. Miech, supra note 146, at 1. High-dose estrogen was among the first hormonal
contraceptives. Wanner & Couchenour, supra note 142, at 43. The first major EC trial using the
hormone was conducted in 1963 at Yale University. Croxatto et al., supra note 138, at I11.
149. Charles E. Rice, Abortion, Euthanasia, and the Need to Build a New 'Culture of Life,' 12
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 497, 510 (1998).
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American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists (ACOG) appointed a
special committee on terminology. 5 ° In 1965, the committee redefined
several terms.' 5 1  Prominent among these was a new definition for
"pregnancy." 152
Before 1964, scientists agreed that pregnancy was established at the
time of fertilization' 5 3 because that event was known to signal the beginning
of embryonic life.' 54 ACOG redefined pregnancy to begin with implantation
of the embryo, 155 an event that occurs after the embryo has been growing for
seven to nine days. 156  ACOG also attempted to change the meaning of
"contraception."' 57 Instead of preventing fertilization, it was redefined to
include post-fertilization interferences such as obstructing implantation. 1
58
150. Id. An orchestrated effort to accomplish professional goals of reducing population at the
expense of important women's rights may be evidenced by the opening remarks made by Dr. J.
Robert Wilson at a 1962 Population Council sponsored conference about LUDs. Lucinda M. Finley,
Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847, 872 (1997).
Acknowledging the serious health risks associated with the use of IUDs, Dr. Wilson stated: "How
serious is that for the particular patient and for the population of the world in general? Not very...
Perhaps the individual patient is expendable in the general scheme of things, particularly if the
infection she acquires is sterilizing but not lethal." Id.
151. Interestingly, this was the same tactic employed by the ASRM (then AFS) in inventing the
term "preembryo." See infra notes 8-9.
152. Rice, supra note 149, at 511.
153. Rice, supra note 149, at 510.
154. Miech, supra note 146, at 1. Some medical dictionaries continue to adhere to the biological
rather than social definition. See MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY
1389 (6th ed. 2002). Pregnancy is defined as "the growth and development.., of a new individual
from conception through the embryonic and fetal periods to birth." Id. "Conception" is defined as
"the beginning of pregnancy, usually taken to be the instant that a spermatozoon enters and ovum
and forms a viable zygote." Id. at 409. Therefore, pregnancy is established at the time of successful
fertilization. Prof. John Robertson appears to concede that conception occurs at fertilization rather
than implantation, noting that couples have to undergo "noncoital IVF conception to employ PGD."
John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 449 (1996)
(emphasis added). As the IVF event, as well as PGD, all must occur prior to implantation, it is clear
that the timing of conception is fertilization. See id. at 448-49. It logically follows that
contraception (contra conception) should interfere with fertilization, not implantation. See id. at 449.
155. Rice, supra note 149, at 511; Miech, supra note 146, at 1; David M. Smolin, Should a Ban on
Reproductive Cloning Include a Ban on Cloning for Purposes of Research or Therapy? 32 CUMB. L.
REV. 487, 496 (2001-2002) (asserting that the shifting of the definition of pregnancy further clouds
the status of the pre-implantation embryo). Grappling with abortion and conception, the Court in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), adopted a post-implantation
definition of pregnancy to determine state interests. See Helen M. Alvare, Catholic Teaching and
the Law Concerning the New Reproductive Technologies, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 107, 119-20
(2002) (distinguishing abortion privacy doctrine from traditional privacy doctrine).
156. Miech, supra note 146, at 1.
157. Id.
158. Id. See also C. Ward Kischer, A Commentary on the Beginning of Life: A View From Human
Embryology, LINACRE QUARTERLY, Aug. 1996, at 73, 76 (noting the orchestration of public
acceptance of chemical contraception through re-definitions). The author, a former Anatomy
Professor at the University of Arizona College of Medicine, quotes from Albert Rosenfeld's 1969
The redefinitions essentially reclassified disparate mechanisms as if they
were one. The new classification of the set was not likely for the
instructional benefit of the consumer, but for the convenience of the
classifier. 159  The likely reason for the redefinitions was to attempt to
separate contraception from the hot-button issue of abortion in order to
promote the social acceptance of chemical contraceptives.' 60 By
reclassifying, a shift in attitudes follows. 16' The manipulative purpose of the
redefinitions may be evidenced by the confusion of terminology in some
medical passages.16
2
For example, an attempt to separate EC from abortion may be
accomplished by characterizing EC as contraceptive rather than
abortifacient. To fulfill this goal, one medical researcher mixes the classical
medical definition of pregnancy with the utilitarian definition of
contraception to support her position.163 She states: "The prevention of
pregnancy before implantation is contraception and not abortion.
'
,
164
Tellingly, the passage concedes that pregnancy could have already occurred
by parsing out as relevant only post-implantation pregnancy. 165 The medical
commentator repeats this strategy as she further attempts to separate EC
from abortion.I 66 Glasier explains that "even compounds known to interrupt
established pregnancy cannot dislodge an implanted embryo, because
implantation would not have occurred." 167 Because Plan B would not sever
an implanted embryo from the womb, Glasier thereby asserts that it is not
abortifacient, regardless of the existence of pregnancy.16
book, which states: "A way around this impasse [chemicals that prevent implantation of already-
formed embryos can be construed as abortifacient rather than contraceptive] has been suggested by
Dr. A.S. Parkes of Cambridge: Equate conception with the time of implantation rather than the time
of fertilization - a difference of only a few days." Id., quoting from ALBERT ROSENFELD, SECOND
GENESIS: THE COMING CONTROL OF LIFE 108 (1969). While the definition may have changed, the
connotation already existed. That is, the intentional meaning of the word that is "suggested inside
one's head" differed from the reformatted definition. HAYAKAWA & HAYAKAWA, supra note 5, at
37.
159. See id. at 107-08 (asserting that classification suits the convenience of the classifier).
160. See Glasier, supra note 122, at 1063; Rivera et al, supra note 138, at 1263, 1264. Likewise,
the reluctance to accept emergency contraception has been attributed to its connection with abortion.
Id.
161. HAYAKAWA & HAYAKAWA, supra note 5, at 108.
162. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
163. Glasier, supra note 122, at 1063.
164. Id. See also Kevin T. McMahon, supra note 138, at 3 (noting that Glasier's conclusion that
EC is not abortifacient rests on her simultaneous definition that no pre-implantation effect is
abortifacient).
165. Glasier, supra note 122, at 1063.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Interestingly, despite its frequent use as an abortifacient to dislodge a post-implantation
embryo, mifepristone, or RU-486, has also been classified as a contraceptive. See, e.g., Wanner &
Couchenour, supra note 142, at 49; Croxatto et al., supra note 138, at 112-13. RU-486 was also
promoted as a contraceptive by the prestigious National Academy of Sciences. Rice, supra note
149, at 511. The manipulative and misleading classification of RU-486 is evident when its inventor
preferred it to be labeled as a "contragestive" to distinguish if from a contraceptive, which prevents
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Glasier reverts to a reformulated utilitarian definition of pregnancy
when she attempts to mainstream EC's use. 169  Glasier asserts that
"contraception" is to be used by a woman who "thinks that she might
become pregnant."'' 70 An "abortifacient," according to Glasier, is something
to be used "when she thinks she might already be pregnant."'' By inserting
the gloss of what a woman thinks on "contraception" and "abortifacient,"
Glasier qualifies those terms as if their meanings were dependent upon a
woman's subjective views about whether she "might become" or "might
already be" pregnant. 72 Glasier acts as though the actual physical condition
of pregnancy were irrelevant.
173
It would appear that Glasier's overall explanation is flawed. Her
apparent concession that the state of pregnancy already exists before
implantation means that conception must have occurred at fertilization, and
not implantation. It should logically follow that contraception (contra
conception) interferes with fertilization, not implantation. 74 Nevertheless,
redefining "contraception" as "before implantation" ostensibly presents a
euphemistic solution in bringing about the mainstream acceptance of EC by
immunizing it from abortion politics.1'7  The force of medical authority
behind the utilitarian definition enables acceptance by such legal authority'
76
as the FDA 77 and effectively forms the normative basis of Plan B's claim to
act only contraceptively.178
The effect is problematic because the utilitarian definitions camouflage
the potentially deleterious effects of EC on early human embryos. As a
result, the veiled definitions impinge on the ability to make an informed
fertilization. Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265,
303 n.183 (1993).
169. Glasier, supra note 122, at 1063.
170. Id.
171. Id. What makes this easy to accept by unsuspecting individuals is that pregnancy cannot
immediately be detected. While conception must occur during the fertile ovulatory period, its
occurrence inside the body is difficult to measure. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The
Political and Moral Battle Over Late-Term Abortion, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 397, 404 (1998).
172. Glasier, supra note 122, at 1063.
173. See id.
174. The inventor of RU-486 recognized that a contraceptive prevents fertilization. Clark, supra
note 168, at 305.
175. See Rice, supra note 149, at 510. Rice characterizes the approach as utilitarian. Id. at 525.
176. See Ikemoto, supra note 104, at 1293.
177. Drugs that inhibit implantation of an already formed embryo are permitted to be classified as
contraceptive. Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for Use as
Postcoital Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8610-01 (section ILA). See also Rice, supra
note 149, at 511 (noting that federal agencies have accepted ACOG's social definition of
pregnancy).
178. See Miech, supra note 146, at 1.
reproductive decision with respect to Plan B that is in accord with one's
personal beliefs. Simultaneously, unsuspecting men and women can easily
be influenced to choose such products as Plan B for "emergency
contraception."' 79  In this fashion, the hidden imposition of viewpoint
stymies the very freedom of choice that is championed by "free choice"
advocates.
III. DENIAL
A. "Embryo Biopsy," PGD, and Extracorporeal Production
During her regular check-up, Chris's physician discovered a small lump.
To rule out malignancy, the physician ordered a biopsy. A small piece of
living tissue was removed and examined microscopically to render a
diagnosis that would either confirm or negate the existence of the targeted
condition.18° Depending upon the results, a course of action would be
planned to treat or remove any diseased tissue.
Suppose that instead of a regular check-up, Chris sought the advice of a
fertility expert because of unsuccessful attempts at pregnancy. Perhaps
Chris might want additional advice on whether she could ensure that her
offspring would not become afflicted with some particular genetic disease
that ran in her family. Whether to improve the chances of becoming a parent
or to eliminate the possibility of passing on certain genetic diseases, a
clinician might suggest using preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).
Using Chris's eggs, embryos could be produced externally in vitro.
Each embryo would then undergo a biopsy so that a qualitative assessment
could be made for each.' 18 So far, this process resembles the medical model.
179. Use of misleading language is manipulation that affects autonomy "by reducing
understanding." RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 348, 351, 362 (1986) (contrasting with persuasion, which influences through improved
understanding). Silence that keeps people uninformed itself is a linguistic tool of orientation. See
CHOMSKY, supra note 12, at 179. Past examples indicate that language is sometimes obscured to
obtain consent that otherwise might not be forthcoming. See George J. Annas, Questing for Grails:
Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 297, 314 (1996) (discussing informed consent, research and therapy). See also Leon R.
Kass, Triumph or Tragedy? The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 8 (2000)
(noting the ease of manipulating patients to "choose" the clinician's preferences by the clinician's
overt or subtle presentation of questions, prognosis, and options).
Evidence of intent to influence is a practice, encouraged by ACOG, where obstetricians and
gynecologists solicit patients to accept EC prescriptions during routine visits. Wanner &
Couchenour, supra note 142, at 51. This includes women who are not sexually active. Westhoff,
supra note 137, at 1833. Plan B is preferred because levonorgestrel in a progestin-only regime has
been shown to be more effective. Id. at 1833-34. Dr. Westhoff has been a consultant for Barr
laboratories, the sponsors of Plan B's over-the-counter use. Id. at 1834.
180. See MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY, supra note 154, at 206
(defining "biopsy").
181. See, e.g., Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint Barnabas,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD)for Translocations, at http://www.sbivf.com-
pgd-translocation.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (hereinafter Saint Barnabas) (intro section) (PGD
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But unlike the medical norm, "embryo biopsy" in conjunction with
assessment of the preimplantation embryo is not utilized as a precursor to
treatment or cure. 182  Instead, PGD, which involves embryo biopsy, is
as "testing an embryo" and performing a "biopsy" on the embryo or blastomere); Janus Net
Technology, Inc., Reprogenetics lis Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2001, at
http://www.reprogenetics.com (last visited June 7, 2004) ("Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
consists of the biopsy of a single cell per embryo, followed by its genetic diagnosis through different
techniques (FISH, PCR, or CGH), and the subsequent replacement to the patient of those embryos
classified by genetic diagnosis as normal"); The Early Show: Gender Selection: Fact or Fiction?
(CBS television broadcast, May 3, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/03/
earlyshow/living/parenting/main615163.shtml?CMP=ILC-SearchStories ("PGD involves fertilizing
eggs in a lab, extracting a cell from the embryos, determining the gender, and implanting only the
desired sex."); Inova Partnership, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD): A Commentary on Its
Utility and Potential Value, (1999-2003) (section 2, entitled "The Role of Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis (PGD)") (PGD is for diagnosis followed by selective transfer). A link to the home page
noted that the sites were designed for The Washington Center for Reproductive Medicine, thereby
linking medicine with marketing. See also Beth Ary, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis: How It
Changes the IVF Experience, Los ANGELES RESOLVE, at http://www.drary.com/draryPGD.htm (last
visited May 27, 2004). Dr. Beth Ary, a reproductive endocrinologist, provides PGD services at her
clinic, The Reproductive Specialty Center, and markets it as a means to improve the "take home"
baby rate. Id.; Good Morning America: Perfect Features: Science May Pave Way For Designer
Babies, (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 26, 2003), available at http://abcnews.go.consections/
GMA/GoodMomingAmerica/GMA021226_DesignerBabies.htm (last visited June 3, 2004). Good
Morning America featured a story about PGD, interviewing The Fertility Institutes director Dr.
Jeffrey Steinberg. Id. Touting PGD as providing "100 percent assurance" when used for gender
selection, he described the process in this way:
In vitro fertilization techniques are used to obtain eggs from the mother, which are then
fertilized in the lab with sperm obtained from the father. Through a sophisticated method
called micro-manipulation, one or more cells are then removed from the developing
embryo two to four days after fertilization. The removed cell or cells are used for
analysis, with results obtained within 12 to 24 hours.
Id. See also Magdalena Bielanska et al., Chromosomal Information Derived from Single
Blastomeres Isolated from Cleavage-Stage Embryos and Cultured In Vitro, 79 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 1304 (2003).
Sometimes far less scientific descriptions are provided. See, e.g., Jerome Groopman, Designing
Babies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2002, at A14; Gladys B. White & Michael E. McClure, Introducing
Innovation into Practice: Technical and Ethical Analyses of PGD and ICSI Technologies, 26 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 5, 5 (1998) ("a method of extracting a cell from a very early embryo formed in vitro
and then examining the DNA of that cell to make determinations about some of the genetic
characterizatics of the human embryo and resulting child")
The cursory descriptions may very well ease anxieties that complex details could generate.
The blandness also underplays the consequences of the PGD process, especially when conclusions of
the propriety of its use is buttressed by reference to the familial, such as in this description: "[Tlhe
eggs harvested from the prospective mother were mixed in the laboratory with her husband's sperm,
and the resulting embryos were tested." Jerome Groopman, supra (emphasis added).
182. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 652 (2003). Embryo biopsy in the context of PGD is
not so much about treatment as it is about circumvention. See id. In the future, perhaps it may be
used in conjunction with gene therapy to produce an on-site "cure," much like the medical model.
See Andrea Bonnicksen, Genetic Diagnosis of Human Embryos, in LIFE CHOICES: A HASTINGS
CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 407, 408 (Joseph H. Howell & William F. Sale eds., 2d ed.
2000) (referring to one clinic's consent form). Since there is currently no evidence of such clinical
offered as a precursor to choice. 183 That is, based on the results of PGD, the
would-be parents, in cooperation with clinicians, decide which embryos will
be used to complete the reproductive process'8 begun when the embryos
were produced in vitro. Only these will be implanted and allowed to
continue their development in utero.
85
Despite this stark reality, PGD has been described as a method for
"therapeutic screening of embryos."'186  The adjective "therapeutic" may
salve but does not realistically describe the end, which is not therapy, but
elimination. PGD has also been characterized as "another prenatal method
of genetic selection."' 187 Manipulation occurs prior to birth and in that sense
is "prenatal."' 88 However, such classification distorts because it suggests an
affinity with prenatal testing that simply does not exist. The term "prenatal"
conjures images of a state of being where a woman is already "with child' 189
- a woman whose physical, umbilical attachment corresponds with a unique
emotional attachment to the entity within. 90 Because of the emotional
investment in the unborn, decisions regarding its fate following an unhappy
prenatal test result have been viewed as far more somber than those
following PGD.' 9' Those decisions are more detached, relating not to the
unborn, but to the unimplanted.
The selection process that gives meaning to a reproductive choice also
differs. In both prenatal testing and PGD, the consequence of a decision is
practice, it is more likely that the form, by reference to some noble therapeutic goal, is designed to
assuage the guilt of those who select for less altruistic ends.
183. Barbara Katz Rothman, Not All That Glitters Is Gold, in LIFE CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER
INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 423, 428 (Joseph H. Howell & William F. Sale eds., 2d ed. 2000);
Robertson, supra note 154, at 421, 449 (although unfettered use may be problematic, reproductive
choice trumps other concerns at this time); Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of
Children: Our Eugenics Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 203-07 (2003) (noting
that "procreative liberty is at a historical" high because of ART, including PGD); Jeffrey R. Botkin,
Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 17, 19 (1998).
184. See LORI B. ANDREWS et al., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 291 (2002) (stating that
up to fifteen embryos may be produced in a single IVF cycle).
185. Id.
186. Jason Christopher Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 12
(2002).
187. Robertson, supra note 154, at 448. See also Sherman Elias, Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis by Comparative Genomic Hybridization, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1569, 1570 (2001)
("extension of prenatal diagnosis"); Andrea Bonnicksen, supra note 182, at 409; Anita Cecchin,
Genetic Screening of Embryos: An Overview, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 11, 112 (Carol
Wekesser et al. eds., 1996); Botkin, supra note 183, at 17 ("new method of prenatal diagnosis");
Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 265,
281 (2003) (a form of prenatal diagnosis).
188. See Robertson, supra note 184, at 421.
189. See MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY, supra note 154, at 1393
(defining "prenatal diagnosis" and noting that the new entity is in utero).
190. See Barbara Katz Rothman, supra note 183, at 428.
191. See Robertson, supra note 154, at 449 (asserting that the decision to abort is more grave than
decisions regarding the fate of embryos following PGD); Botkin, supra note 187, at 281 (PGD a
"less ethically troubling" decision).
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to change the status quo. In the traditional prenatal sense, status quo means
that growth and development continue toward birth. Choice alters this by
causing the termination of biological life - a decidedly negative
consequence. By contrast, the exercise of reproductive choice following
embryo diagnosis appears far more positive because it facilitates the
continuation of life. Selection lifts an embryo from its state of indefinite
suspension and perfects the promise of mortality.
The positive consequence of choice in the latter context is seductive.
Certain genetic diseases, for instance, can be eliminated by selecting
embryos free of the mutation. 192 As knowledge about the human genome
expands, so will the number of genetic conditions and traits for which
diagnostic testing will become available. 93 As a result, parents, drawn in by
the allure of choice, will assume expansive control over the genetic traits of
the embryos they choose to bear, including those driven by taste.'94
Not everyone believes that this will result in an emotionally healthy
society.' 95 Some commentators are concerned about the objectification of
children,' 96 genetic discrimination, 97 and the slippery slope toward the
192. For a list of more than fifty "disorders" now able to be diagnosed by PGD, see Reproductive
Genetics Institute, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (2002-2003), at
http://www.reproductivegenetics.com/preimplantation.php (last visited June 4, 2004).
193. MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
SOCIETY 2 (2003); Botkin, supra note 183, at 19.
194. See Andrea Bonnicksen, supra note 182, at 409-13, 417; Rothman, supra note 183, at 429.
Because of the widespread ethos of "possessive individualism" in America and other modem
cultures, access to genetic technologies is unlikely to be curbed by law or by appeal to moral
argument. Regine Kollek, Technicalisation of Human Procreation and Social Living Conditions, in
THE ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 139, 147 (Hille Haker & Deryck Beyleveld, eds.
2000). Moreover, as PGD becomes more normalized, it is likely to be viewed less and less as a
choice that first drew couples to it and more and more as a compelled imposition. See Sonia Mateu
Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 255 (2002) (analogizing to
prenatal screening where the pressure to screen has become so strong that choice appears to be an
illusion).
195. See, e.g., Vicki G. Norton, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic
Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1610, 1604 (1994).
196. Id.; Roberts, supra note 186, at 23-24; Malinowski, supra note 183, at 207-09 (expressing
concern over the impact on children); Cecchin, supra note 187, at 112; Kelly M. Plummer,
Comment, Ending Parents' Unlimited Power to Choose: Legislation is Necessary to Prohibit
Parents' Selection of Their Children's Sex and Characteristics, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 517, 520
(2003).
Interestingly, an argument offered to rebut this objection to PGD is that every parent-child
relationship involves some instrumentation because of parental expectations and demands on
children. See Donrich W. Jordaan, Preimplantation Genetic Screening aqd Selection: An Ethical
Analysis, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 586, 590 (2003). While this may have some initial appeal, it
should be noted that to the extent that parents attempt to pigeonhole children, it is generally
condemned. To borrow an old clich: two wrongs do not make a right.
197. Norton, supra note 195, at 1604.
social acceptance of eugenics.' 98  Additional concerns include the lack of
regulation over ART in general, particularly since recent studies indicate that
all children born of ART procedures are at a serious risk of harm. 199
Despite the existence of these important unresolved issues that affect the
whole of society, there is little to restrain the marketing or expansive
utilization of PGD to achieve clients' preferential ends. Professor John
Robertson, an influential legal scholar in the field of reproductive
technologies, believes that utilization of PGD even for the sole purpose of
gender selection may garner constitutional protection under the rubric of
reproductive liberty. 0 While several commentators disagree,2 ' the debate
198. Botkin, supra note 183, at 22 (rejection of those with disabilities); Susan M. Wolf et al.,
Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 332-33 (2003) (welcoming PGD, but concerned about unregulated use
that permits its use for traits rather than serious disease); David Cram & David de Kretser, Genetic
Diagnosis: the Future, in ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEW
HORIZONS 186, 195 (Christopher J. De Jonge & Christopher L. R. Barratt eds., 2002) (expressing
concern over PGD's use in selecting merely desirable physical and social traits); Robertson, supra
note 154, at 449-50 (recognizing the potential for abuse when applied to less serious conditions);
Roberts, supra note 186, at 4 (noting that PGD could open the floodgates to "customizing
conception"); Malinowski, supra note 183, at 203-04 (appreciating the eugenics issue, but noting
that the American ethos of autonomy and procreative liberty would prevent governmental
imposition); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal
Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 201-03 (2004)
(addressing the eugenics associated with embryo transfer); Suzanne Holland, Selecting Against
Difference: Assisted Reproduction, Disability and Regulation, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 408-09
(2003) (asserting legislation is needed to limit ART-associated eugenics). But see Judith F. Daar,
The Prospect of Human Cloning: Improving Nature or Dooming the Species? 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 511, 540 (2003) (stating that there is no evidence of PGD resulting in the harms of
commodification of children or eugenics).
Leon Kass expresses concern that use of genetic technologies as a whole negatively impacts
human dignity. Kass, supra note 179, at 2-3, 7-9, 11-12 (2000). Power exercised by the medical
profession will eugenically shape the form of mankind and deem some members of the human race
inferior to others, based upon their genetic composition. Id. Norms of health and enhancement will
become further blurred and without clear distinction. Id. The final tragedy, says Kass, is that
experience shows us that the "improvements" rendered by the application of genetic technologies are
unlikely to bring about greater human satisfaction. Id.
199. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the
Law Protect Them From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 59-61 (2004) (including low birth weight,
multiple births, which are at an increased risk of serious health problems). Unlike most other
medical interventions, clinical application of PGD was introduced without a rigorous research phase.
Thus, long-term (and many short-term) ramifications have not adequately been identified. See
Richard J. Tasca & Michael E. McClure, The Emerging Technology and Application of
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 7, 8 (1998). An additional problem is
the separation of economic classes where only top-earners will benefit from ART technologies.
Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural and Legal Implications of Creating and Sustaining Life
Through Biomedical Technology, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 469, 473 (1996).
200. John A. Robertson, Preconception Gender Selection, I AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 3-4 (2001)
(suggesting that a constitutional right to utilize technology may extend to sex selection). Accord,
Donrich W. Jordaan, supra note 196, at 589 (stating that restriction on the use of PGD (or
preimplantation screening and selection, as preferred by the author) interferes with procreative
autonomy). See also MEHLMAN, supra note 193, at 174 (2003) (restricting genetic enhancement
through PGD might be unconstitutional).
201. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 195, at 1621-22 (believing there to be no constitutional basis for
sex selection); Jodi Danis, Sexism and "The Superfluous Female": Arguments for Regulating Pre-
implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 249 & nn.148 & 167 (1995)
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will remain largely theoretical until statutory and regulatory provisions are
in place and tested.20 2 But first, law-makers need to overcome their current
deference to the medical profession.20 3
A general lack of oversight might explain how PGD has come to be
offered for selection of embryos where the only criterion is gender
preference, notwithstanding a seemingly contradictory view that the
Constitution frowns upon gender discrimination. 204 Although promoters of
the application of PGD for sex selection recognize the gender discrimination
issue, some pooh-pooh the notion that it will have an ill effect on society.20 5
(distinguishing pre-implantation sex selection from abortion, sex selection abortion, sterilization, and
other reproductive decisions).
Currently, it is unclear to what extent there may be constitutional protection. A constitutional
right to procreate is generally thought to exist, based on such seminal cases as Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (reproduction a basic civil right), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(right to be free of "unwarranted governmental intrusion" in reproductive decisions), and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (procreation central to
14th Amendment liberties). Carl H. Coleman, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the
Constitution, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 57, 61 (2002). Some believe a right would extend to the use of
ART to produce families. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1083, 1103-04, 1116 (1998) (viewing relational privacy as
protecting the decision to form a family via ART provided that the couples own gametes are used).
Whether any such right would extend to the specific selection of embryos based on gender
criteria could potentially depend upon the level of constitutional scrutiny applied to challenged
legislation that banned PGD for that purpose. Susan M. Faust, Baby Girl or Baby Boy? Now You
Can Choose: A Look at New Biology and No Law, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 281, 299-300 (2000).
It is argued that such legislation is likely to be upheld based on a state's legitimate interests in
creating the ban. Plummer, supra note 196, at 525-44; Rachel E. Remaley, "The Original Sexist
Sin ": Regulating Preconception Sex Selection Technology, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 260-66 (2000).
202. Scholars tend to speak in terms of "should not" and "argue against" rather than "legally
cannot." See Botkin, supra note 187, at 290 (referring to authors Thomas Murray, Stephen Post,
Peter Whitehouse, and Dena Davis). Moreover, self-regulating professional ethics have no legal
effect and only discourage, but do not prohibit, the liberal use of PGD. See id. at 288-89.
203. Malinowski, supra note 183, at 207-08. Stemming from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140-44,
148-50 (1973), there has been deference to the medical profession in a way that merges with
procreative rights, bolstering parental control while limiting governmental interference.
Malinowski, supra note 183, at 208. In fact, ART is likely not regulated because of procreative
rights. Id. at 203-04. Prof. Alvare is more pragmatic. She asserts that the ASRM was influential in
ensuring that inspectors certifying fertility labs under the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act would have no authority over the clinical practices. Alvare, supra note 109, at 28.
204. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 (2003) (citing case where gender discrimination was presumed
unconstitutional); James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision
Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 917-18 (2003) (citing cases
where custody determinations based on presumptions favoring the female gender was considered
unconstitutional).
205. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 154, at 452 (asserting it will not because of insufficient use);
Botkin, supra note 187, at 281 (asserting that American cultural norms considered unlikely to
produce the gender disequilibrium that has occurred in China); Claudia Kalb, Brave New Babies,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 44, 50-51 (rebutting the idea that PGD is discriminatory by reference
to reproductive choice and potentially fewer abortions).
As evidence, some aver that the male to female ratio will not be disturbed
because gender discrimination has been applied evenly to both sexes,2 °6 in
stark contrast to what has occurred in the Chinese population.2 7 Even the
term labeling the use of PGD solely to select an embryo of the preferred
gender suggests a non-discriminatory justification: It is euphemistically
marketed as "family balancing. 2 8
The expression "family balancing" implies that balance is the valued
good. In actuality, it is not really balance, but how the decision-makers feel
about it, that matters. 20 9  Thus, gender preference, which itself has no
intrinsic value, is provided palatable approval. This concept is bolstered by
an appeal to tradition.21 ° In the popular press, the topic of gender selection
has been juxtaposed with stories about ancestral rituals and their failure to
produce the gender-preferred offspring that were the subject of the ritual.21'
By such reference, gender discrimination appears understandable and
normal, and PGD rises as the champion of tradition, replacing hocus-pocus
with the accuracy and predictability of science and technology.2 2 Thereby,
206. The Reproductive Specialty Center, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, at
http://www.drary.com/pgd.htm (last visited May 27, 2004) (noting that the clinic's own statistics
indicated an even number of requests to select girls or boys). Even so, there is evidence that sexism
in the form of a preference for first-born males still exists. Faust, supra note 201, at 289-92.
207. The Reproductive Specialty Center, supra note 206; Mary Carmichael, No Girls, Please,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 50; Danis, supra note 201, at 232.
208. See, e.g., Genetics & IVF Institute, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Family
Balancing, available at http://www.givf.comgender-selection.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); Saint
Barnabas, supra note 186; Kalb, supra note 205, at 47.
209. See, e.g., Remaley, supra note 201, at 275-76 (disputing that PGD will lead to balanced
families and arguing that it is sexist and discriminatory). Remaley disputes Wertz's affirmation of
the desire for a child of the same gender, DOROTHY C. WERTZ, SEX SELECTION, IN ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BioETHiCS 2212, 2215 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995), noting that modern culture permits
parents to enjoy activities with children of both sexes. Remaley, supra note 201, at 276-70. See also
Barbara Kantrowitz, One, Two, Three or More? NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 53. Although the
article purports to justify "family balancing," all it really does is identify the well-known benefits of
having smaller families and noting parental preference for a child of a particular gender. Id. Since
no benefit was expressed other than parental desire, affirming a choice to utilize PGD solely for
gender selection appears to be the primary motive, especially since it was the trailer to a more
extensive article on PGD. See also Reproductive Specialty Center, supra note 206 ("We think it is
right to trust parents to make these decisions.").
The May 2001 ASRM Ethics Committee Report initially stated that it was ethical for parents to
choose an embryo based on their desire to have a child of a sex opposite to one already existing.
Roberts, supra note 186, at 17. In September, 2001, John Robertson, the committee's Chair,
broadened the scope of what would be considered ethical. Id. at 19. The primary concern was not
the prior existence of a child of the opposite sex, but rather that couples are fully informed about
risks and are "counseled about having unrealistic expectations about the behavior of children of the
preferred gender." Id. Clearly it was reproductive choice rather than family balancing that was the
real issue, at least for Prof. Robertson. The Ethics Committee retreated slightly the following
February, stating that gender selection for the first child should be "discouraged." Id. at 20. The
ASRM did not, however, proclaim it to be unethical. Id. Thus, "discouraged" could be considered
no more than aspirational at best, while the true root of the practice was related to parental choice.
210. See, e.g., The Early Show: Gender Selection: Fact or Fiction?, supra note 181.
211. See, e.g., id.; Karen Springen, The Ancient Art of Making Babies, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004,
at 51.
212. The Early Show: Gender Selection: Fact or Fiction?, supra note 181. The story asserts that
"[flor now, most experts agree, the best chances [to produce a child of the preferred gender] come
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choice, as well as the means by which that choice is realized, becomes
normalized.1 3
The achievement of social normalcy seems to be a recurring theme in
the language of reproductive technology. With respect to PGD, including
embryo biopsy and embryo diagnosis, it is normalized by association with
the already widely-accepted IVF procedures, 2t4 and by its promotion as "a
precision targeting of the sources of human suffering" 215 to which we each
from a procedure called PGD-Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis." Id. See also Remaley, supra
note 201, at 249-50 (describing PGD as an accurate sex-selection technique, unlike the superstitious
practice over the ages to accomplish that end).
213. See Ikemoto, supra note 104, at 1287-93. Utilizing the medicalization of childbirth and the
availability of prenatal testing as examples, the author explains that mere availability of scientific
intervention results in its use, even if not really needed. Id. at 1290-91. Assumptions about science
as neutral and disinterested lead "to assumptions about the utilization of new technology as
necessary and good." Id. at 1290. Notwithstanding unresolved questions about whether utilization
of new technology is even ethical, its use quickly becomes a social norm. Id. at 1292-93.
Some on-line descriptions about PGD on clinic web pages or popular press raised only ethical
issues of gender selection. To the extent other issues were raised, they were rebutted by reference to
choice. See, e.g., The Early Show, supra note 181 ("It's up to parents to decide .... ); Good
Morning America, supra note 181; The Reproductive Specialty Center, supra note 206 (concern is
rebutted by pointing out that it is already legal to abort for purposes of gender selection). Such
assertions avoid recognizing that "legal" and "ethical" mean different things.
But see Groopman, supra note 181, at A14 (asserting that eugenics also a controversy, but
rebutted with reproduction as personal choice); Kalb, supra note 205, at 46-47 (asserting that ethical
issues include eugenics as well as sex discrimination). The article alludes to the acceptance of broad
reproductive freedom by including a quote from Yury Verlinsky, a PGD expert from the
Reproductive Genetics Institute in Chicago: "I tell them it's normal and I tell them it's male or
female.... It's their embryo. I can't tell them which one to transfer." Id. at 48. The deferential
statement suggests non-directive counseling. But one wonders what part of PGD utilization is
choice and what part is induced by marketing that "normalizes" the procedure and minimizes ethical
concerns. Some clinics have recruited couples for PGD by offering it as a free bonus to their fertility
programs. Id. at 44, 46. Furthermore, not all counselors believe they should be non-directional.
Biesecker, Privacy in Genetic Counseling, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 108, 111-12 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). Although a
eugenic motive may be laudable, particularly when it is to reduce genetic disease, in this context it
also greatly impacts parental freedom of choice insofar as the true nature and consequences is not
identified. See infra (cloning); June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Involuntary Cloning: A Battery, 79 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). Directive counseling at the crucial time also enables counselors
to effectively market the procedure at a time that couples are at a heightened emotional state and
therefore more vulnerable to persuasion.
214. See, e.g., The Reproductive Specialty Center, supra note 206 ("as in routine in vitro
fertilization"). From the descriptions, it may not be clear when PGD departs from IVF. See also
Genoma, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), at http://www.laboratoriogenoma.it/
eng/pgd.asp ("The genetic material of the embryos (which is derived from both parents) is not
altered in any way during a PGD cycle, and early embryological development is similar to natural
conception, except that it occurs in the laboratory.").
215. Groopman, supra note 181, at A14. Dr. Groopman is a Harvard Medical School Professor
and chief of experimental medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Boston. Id.
According to Leon Kass, the elimination of suffering is a dominant principle that is promoted as a
governing moral justification for embracing genetic technology as a whole. Kass, supra note 179, at
7-8, 11 (discussing genetic technologies in general). When voiced by scientists, who are incorrectly
can relate in some way. PGD is also normalized when it is endorsed as an
improvement over prenatal testing, which has been presented as a more
burdensome approach to reducing human suffering. The normalization also
occurs whenever PGD is depicted as facilitating what has already been
normalized in American culture, reproductive choice. But is it really just an
extension of the ordinary, the "normal" made possible by the development
of the technologically extraordinary?
The extraordinary technology involved in PGD facilitates cell removal
and diagnostic testing.216 Unlike prenatal testing, where the embryonic or
fetal cells that are collected for testing have already been naturally sloughed
from the developing body,217 biopsy of an IVF embryo involves the removal
of a single cell directly from the embryo.218 An IVF embryo is cultured in a
medium for two or three days until it has grown to a mass of about six or
eight cells, 219 each of which is called a blastomere. 220 Then, in a departure
from the IVF norm, one of the blastomeres is removed, often by aspiration
through a glass micropipette.221 The biopsy is complete and the isolated
blastomere undergoes diagnostic testing.222
perceived as presenting morally neutral views, the information communicated to clients is
tremendously persuasive. Id. Kass points out a problem with the ethos: Current standards directed
at improving health are shifting ones that have no ultimate boundary. Id. at 10-11. Dehumanization
and loss of human dignity result as humans move to elevate their biological nature and devalue their
self concept as moral beings. See id. at 13-16.
216. Genoma, How Is PGD Carried Out, section on Polar Body Removal and/or Blastomere
Biops (2002), at http://www.laboratoriogenoma.it/eng/pgd-polar.asp.
217. In amniocentesis, for example, fetal cells are collected from the surrounding amniotic fluid.
MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY, supra note 154, at 81-82 (defining
"amniocentesis"). In chorionic villus sampling, or CVS, cells are obtained from placental tissue. Id.
at 356 (defining "chorionic villus sampling"). Fetal cell sorting tests cells that are circulating in the
maternal blood. Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 967, 970-71 (1996).
218. Sometimes two blastomeres are removed. How Is PGD Carried Out, supra note 216; see
also Conception Technologies, Announcing Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: PGD May Improve
Chances for Successful Pregnancy and Birth, (2001), at http://www.conceptiontechnologies.com/
pgd.asp (last visited June 7, 2004).
219. See LUCINDA L. VEECK, AN ATLAS OF HUMAN GAMETE AND CONCEPTUSES: AN
ILLUSTRATED REFERENCE FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 193 (1999); Karen Sermon
& Inge Liebaers, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Screening, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE:
MOLECULAR, CELLULAR AND GENETIC FUNDAMENTALS 515, 516-17 (Bart C.J.M. Fauser et al. eds.,
2003) (seven or more cells); Id. at 516 (also called a cleavage-stage biopsy); See VEECK, supra (also
called a blastomere biopsy).
220. Moshe Zilberstein & Machelle M. Seibel, Preimplantation Genetics and Preimplantation
Diagnosis, in INFERTILITY: A COMPREHENSIVE TExT 761, 763 (Machelle M. Seibel ed., 2d ed.
1997).
221. Alan R. Thornhill & Karen Snow, Molecular Diagnostics in Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis, 4 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 11, section "Materials and Methods" (2002), at
http:/jmd.amjpathol.orglcgilcontentlfulll4/l/l 1.
222. One of two testing procedures is generally applied. Luca Gianaroli et al., Preimplantation
Genetics in Human Embryology, in BIOTECHNOLOGY OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 301, 303 (Alberto
Revelli et al. eds., 2003). The chromosomes may be analyzed for abnormality or gender by means
of a technique called fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH). Id.; Frances A. Flinter,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Needs to be Tightly Regulated, 322 BMJ 1008 (2001), available
at http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/3227293. Genetic diseases or conditions can also be confirmed
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It is extraordinary that technology allows for the precise curettage of a
single cell from something so tiny as an embryo. It is also extraordinary that
the removal of such a huge proportion of matter (about one-sixth of the
entire mass) does not leave the remaining embryo lacking - a reassurance
offered repeatedly.223 A few clinics that offer the service explain the reason
for this remarkable phenomenon.224  Because each blastomere of a six- to
eight-celled embryo is totipotent, every cell contains the full component of
genetic material. 225 Thus, removal of one cell will not leave the remaining
embryo any less complete because it still has all the information needed for
normal embryonic development.226  Juxtaposing the explanation of
totipotency with the further comment that the embryo will be "unaffected"
suggests that there is no other significance to the totipotent characteristic of
blastomeres. At the very moment that a client's thoughts might stray, focus
is diverted back onto the "unaffected" embryo. Thus, there is a dual use of
language to guide acceptance of the process.227
Focus on the host embryo draws attention away from the consequence
of totipotency on the separated blastomere.2 2 8 The cell that is withdrawn is
by means of the polymerase chain reaction process, commonly known as PCR. Gianaroli et al.,
supra. Testing destroys the cell. Guido de Wert, Ethics of Assisted Reproduction, in
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE: MOLECULAR, CELLULAR AND GENETIC FUNDAMENTALS 645, 650 (Bart
C.J.M. Fauser et al. eds., 2003).
223. See, e.g., Saint Barnabas, supra note 181 (section entitled "Issues of Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis - PGD"); Medical Market Analysts, Inc., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), at
http://www.seattleivf.com/pgd.html (last visited June 7, 2004) (stating that the home page was
designed for The Washington Center for Reproductive Medicine); Abington Reproductive Medicine,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis at Abington Reproductive Medicine (1997-2002), at
http://www.abington-repromed.com/our-services/content-layout2.cfm?pid=7 (last visited June 7,
2004). See also COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Embryo Biopsy (6th ed. 2004), available at
http:/www.encyclopedia.comlhtml/el/embryop.asp (last visited June 7, 2004) (stating that PGD
involves "embryo biopsy" in which a cell is removed from an embryo which itself is "unaffected").
224. See, e.g., The Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint Barnabas, at
www.sbivf.com/science/artaneuploidy.htm (last visited on June 7, 2003).
225. Id.
226. Id. In layman's terms, it means that the "cells are virtually identical to each other.
Genetically testing these blastomeres can usually reflect the genetic integrity of the entire embryo."
Kentucky Center for Reproductive Medicine and IVF, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, at
http://www.kcrm-ivf.com/pgd.htm (last visited June 7, 2004). See also Fertility Centers of New
England, LLC, Fertility Centers of New England Announces World's First Published Report of a
Birth from a Cryopreserved Embryo Analyzed by Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), at
http://www.fertilitycenter.com/Services/pdg.htm (last visited June 7, 2004) ("At this early stage of
embryo development, all cells are equivalent and removal of one or two does not affect viability,
cleavage rate, or rates of further development.").
227. See CHOMSKY, supra note 12, at 179. Silence itself is a manipulative use of language. Id.
(asserting that silence is a "gift" suppressing reality).
228. See June Mary Zekan Makdisi, supra note 213. After providing the clinics' explanation
about totipotency, sixty-three percent of my class of about seventy law students failed to make the
connection that totipotency might also be significant to the severed blastomere (Torts class, Sept. 17,
2003).
not merely something that is lost but not needed, as the explanation implies.
The significance of detachment is that once isolated, the totipotent
blastomere takes on new relevance as an individual entity apart from the
embryo from which it was removed; the removal causes the formation of an
embryonic twin. That is, embryo biopsy results in the production of a clone
with independent significance. 229  This is a remarkable and significant
difference from the ordinary biopsy. Yet consumers, unless alerted, would
have no idea that the results differ so dramatically from other biopsies.230
Following ordinary biopsy, where one has no expectation that the cells
have independent moral relevance, the extracted cells are used to serve the
diagnostic needs of the body from which they are drawn. By contrast, PGD
is not generally offered to determine an appropriate therapy on the embryo
from which the blastomere was withdrawn. Instead, the blastomere clone is
exploited to serve the ends of the decision-maker.231 In short, "embryo
biopsy" is not just an extension of the ordinary, the "normal" made possible
by the development of the technologically extraordinary. Use of the terms
"embryo biopsy" or "embryo diagnosis" euphemistically masks the
consequence of the process and the true nature of the biopsy and diagnosis.
The resultant reduced understanding thereby impinges on a consumer's
autonomous choice to select or refuse the technology.232
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the three sections above outlined the infusion of language that
shaped public acceptance of some aspect of reproductive technologies.233
229. Makdisi, supra note 213. The AFS has itself recognized that the severed blastomere may
become a unique individual human being. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
I, supra note 9, at 26S. One of the Committee's members recognized the potential for use in
purposeful twinning, or reproductive cloning. See Robertson, supra note 57, at 1025 (anticipating
human application of animal husbandry manipulations such as embryo-splitting).
230. While consent forms discuss the process and risks associated with the embryo whose cell is
removed for analysis, they may not represent the clonal nature of the biopsy. See, e.g., IVF Labs,
LLC, PGD Information Package 18-22, at http://www.ivflabs.com/PGD-INFO-7-19-04.pdf (last
visited June 7, 2004) (consent form revised 8/22/03).
231. These ends are not limited to reproductive. A recent development in reprogenetics is to
gestate not for the purpose of increasing family size per se, but to save a member of the family
already afflicted with a disease that offers the hope of "cure" if provided the right transplant donor -
that is, one who is an HLA match. Wolf et al., supra note 198, at 327. If a couple uses IVF to
produce embryos, PGD can identify the HLA match. Id. That embryo can be implanted, birthed,
and once born, used as a donor source for the designated donee, potentially throughout life. Id.
232. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 179, at 348, 351, 362 (noting that misleading
language resulting in reduced understanding negatively impacts autonomy).
233. Other groups of words could have been discussed. Cloning, including reproductive,
therapeutic, and cloning for research is one such group. See Henry T. Greely, Banning "Human
Cloning": A Study in the Difficulties of Defining Science, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 131 (1998)
(noting the manipulations, in part, and lack of legislators' understanding of the term in formulating a
bill of cloning); Makdisi, supra note 70, at 497-502 (discussing the proposed congressional bills
related to cloning); Annas, supra note 179, at 300-01 (noting that "therapeutic research" connotes
justification for the procedure as therapy when the treatment is really experimentation, physicians
are really researchers, and patients are subjects). Another set of terms eumphemizes abortion. See,
e.g., Timothy J. Vinciguerra, Notes of a Foot-Soldier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1167, 1181-82 (1999)
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Because the connotation a layperson would understand the words under
discussion to mean does not always comport with biological reality, there is
a gap in common understanding. While word choices may have some
perceived benefit in shaping consensus, the achievement of that goal
interferes with the very principle of autonomy that is adopted by proponents
of reproductive technologies. If the consumer doesn't understand how a
"product" such as emergency contraception or PGD comports with personal
moral views, how can an autonomous choice be made?234  Where
reproductive decisions must be made, truth includes not just a
commentator's or even the "law's" conclusion about life versus non-life or
acceptability versus non-acceptability. It includes the proper identification
of the biological processes and facts so that others are permitted to make
unmanipulated choices.
("multifetal pregnancy reduction"); Rosato, supra note 199, at 85 ("selective reduction"). Also, the
term "products of conception" evidences commodification of the early embryo. Robyn Rowland,
Reproductive Technologies Harm Women, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 37, 38 (Carol
Wekesser et al. eds., 1996).
234. See Leon R. Kass, Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of
Perfection, THE NEW ATLANTIS 9, 12 (200321) (regarding the term "cloning-for-biomedical-
research," which ignores the biological reality that an embryo is formed in the process). There may
be no easy solution to terminology, but "[aiccurate description is crucial to moral evaluation." Id.
38
